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Summary
1. Introduction
Tanzania is a low-income country on the eastern coast of Africa and has what can be considered a
small economy. A large proportion of the population lives below the poverty baseline of USD 2 a
day. One important means of reducing poverty is ensuring access to financial services. However,
in Tanzania, as in most developing countries, access to financial services is extremely limited.
There are three categories of financial service providers in the country: formal, semi-formal, and
informal. The formal microfinance institutions (MFIs) mainly comprise banks. The semi-formal
MFIs consist of savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), such as BRAC Tanzania. Informal MFIs comprise of informal groups such as rotating
savings and credit associations (ROSCAs).
Financial services from formal MFIs are available only to a very small fraction of the popu-
lation. The lack of collateral is one of the main reasons for this. Due to limitations in the formal
sector, the microfinance sector in Tanzania relies largely on the semi-formal and informal MFIs.
However, informal MFIs are confronted with several challenges, such as unreliability and high
interest rates, a common feature found in many developing countries.
Due to the reasons mentioned, semi-formal MFIs can be considered a better option because
they serve the poor who have been excluded from formal MFIs by providing a wide range of
financial services such as small-sized loans and savings services. Most importantly, semi-formal
MFIs have introduced collateral substitutes. NGO MFIs have introduced group lending, in which
members form groups and guarantee each other whereas cooperative-based MFIs (SACCOs) use
savings as a collateral substitute, where members can borrow against their savings.
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2. Purpose and Significance of the Research
In discussing the performance, this study first examines the outreach of the selected SACCOs and
BRAC Tanzania in terms of credit expansion. Second, the study analyzes the efficiency of the se-
lected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania in terms of operating costs. Third, it examines the repayment
performance of BRAC Tanzania group loans, and finally, it empirically assesses the factors that
determine loan repayment performance of group loans implemented by BRAC Tanzania.
Several academic studies discuss various topics regarding semi-formal MFIs, but a gap in this
area still remains in the literature. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there are no studies
on Tanzanian semi-formal MFIs that focus on both SACCOs and NGOs using institutional and
members’ data to assess the performance of these institutions.
3. Methodology of the Research
This study used both primary and secondary data. The primary data were collected through ob-
servations, interviews, and questionnaires. The interviews and questionnaires were conducted
with various BRAC Tanzania and SACCOs key informants and BRAC Tanzania members. The
secondary data were obtained from reports and financial statements of the two representative semi-
formal MFIs.
The analysis of the performance of the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania is based on dif-
ferent samples. In analyzing performance in terms of outreach and efficiency, three representative
SACCOs (Nanenane Women, Krokoni, and Umatama) were selected from the roster of SACCOs
operating in the Arusha region. While selecting, the following criteria were used: (i) community-
based, (ii) have a long-standing operating experience (five years or more), and (iii) hold a large
amount of outstanding loans compared to other SACCOs in the region. In analyzing the repay-
ment performance of BRAC Tanzania group lending, ten groups from the Tengeru branch, one of
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the BRAC Tanzania branches in the Arusha region, were randomly selected. The questionnaires
were administered to 177 members. Lastly, to empirically determine factors for the repayment
performance of the BRAC Tanzania group lending, 183 groups were randomly selected.
4. Research Findings
The study finds notable differences between the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania in various
aspects. First, the selected SACCOs offer both credits and savings services, while BRAC Tanza-
nia offers only credits services; this is because NGO MFIs in Tanzania are not allowed to accept
savings. Second, the selected SACCOs lends to individuals, whereas BRAC Tanzania uses group
lending. Third, BRAC Tanzania offers loans of a smaller size than the selected SACCOs suggest-
ing that BRAC Tanzania serves poorer borrowers than the selected SACCOs. Fourth, the interest
rates charged by BRAC Tanzania are considerably higher than those charged by the selected SAC-
COs. Fifth, BRAC Tanzania has higher operating costs than that of the selected SACCOs.
Regarding performance, the study finds that the representative semi-formal MFIs are success-
ful in increasing outreach through credit expansion. Although BRAC Tanzania is barred from
accepting deposits by regulations, SACCOs members benefit from access not only to credit ser-
vices but also to savings services. The difference in the level of outreach between BRAC Tanzania
and the selected SACCOs reflects the difference in their target clients, business orientation, and
mission. The selected SACCOs serve members who are united by a common bond, providing
them with bigger loans whereas BRAC Tanzania mainly focuses on poor women. The selected
SACCOs are also diversified in various aspects, such as their target clients, types of loan, and loan
amounts and durations, which suggests that the selected SACCOs serve a wider variety of clients.
In discussing efficiency, descriptive and empirical analyses were used. Based on the descrip-
tive analysis, the study did not find a clear trend in terms of efficiency for the analysis period.
To confirm this, a regression analysis was conducted. The results show that operating costs did
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not decrease over time, implying that there was no efficiency gain, possibly due to a lack of cost
reduction innovations. BRAC Tanzania had higher operating costs than the selected SACCOs.
The observed difference is caused by the difference in the loan amounts offered by the selected
SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania. The latter, on average, offers small-sized loans compared to those
offered by the selected SACCOs and managing very small-sized loans involves high transaction
costs. Due to its higher operating costs, BRAC Tanzania charge higher interest rates than the
selected SACCOs.
Using the case of BRAC Tanzania group lending, the study finds that BRAC Tanzania has
achieved high repayment performance. Approximately 96% of all loans are recovered. This con-
stitutes proof that even the poor can repay their loans on time when the appropriate mechanisms
are in place. Institutional design such as frequent client visits, frequent repayment schedules, and
strict loan approval processes also play an important role.
To examine the determinants of the repayment performance in the BRAC Tanzania group
lending, a logit regression was used. The results confirm as well as contradict the views generally
stated in the literature. Peer pressure and social ties in the groups show no significant effects
on improving repayment performance. This is contrary to what the theory would predict. Also,
groups located in different areas appear to enforce repayment within their membership in different
ways. In urban groups, repayment rates are improved primarily by joint liability. For groups
located in rural areas, where information can be obtained at low cost, peer screening is an important
factor in improving the repayment rates. The functions of groups also differ according to the
location. In rural areas, peer screening and peer monitoring show significant effects, whereas in
urban areas, only peer monitoring exhibits a significant effect.
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5. Policy Implications
Based on the findings, this study has the following policy implications: The representative semi-
formal MFIs differ despite the fact that they fall under the same category. Their differences include
their institutional structures, products, and target clients. This study, therefore, suggests diversifi-
cation of the underlying regulations to address the differences in operations and services offered
by semi-formal MFIs.
Furthermore, representative semi-formal MFIs fail to achieve efficiency. Greater attention
must be paid to reducing operating costs and enhancing efficiency so that a large proportion of
the poor can be served by semi-formal MFIs. It is important for the government to support and
create an environment that encourages innovations in financial systems. Such support can include
investment in infrastructure or in innovations that aims to achieve a cost-effective provision of
financial services.
The results suggest that even poor borrowers can pay back the loans reliably and on time. For
this reason, the government should encourage and promote broader participation of other MFIs,
especially formal MFIs to fill the unmet demands gap. Semi-formal MFIs have already tried and
proved that they can work with the poor. Government support may motivate other providers such
as commercial banks to offer microloans. Many potential lessons might be drawn from semi-
formal MFIs. For example, a variety of collateral substitutes and repayment incentives can be
used. Continued promotion and support of semi-formal MFIs is also important.
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Chapter 1.
Introduction
1.1 Background of the Study
Around 736 million people lived on less than 2 USD a day, which is equivalent to 10 percent of the
world’s population. More than half of the extreme poor in the world live in Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA). The number has increased by 9 million, with 413 million people living on less than USD 2
a day in 2015, more than all the other regions combined. If this trend continues, by 2030, nearly
9 out of 10 extreme poor will be in SSA (World Bank, 2019). Tanzania is one of the countries in
SSA and has what can be considered a small economy. A large proportion of the population lives
below the poverty baseline of USD 2.1 This is especially true in rural areas (Marr and Tubaro,
2011a; IFAD, 2015).2
Access to financial services is one of the important means of poverty alleviation (Yunus, 2007;
Dunford, 2006). It is also acknowledged by Klapper et al. (2016) as a key enabler in achieving
sustainable development goals (SDGs). Furthermore, access to financial services has been cred-
ited in improving financial outcomes including savings and the accumulation of assets such as
furniture or a sewing machine, as well as non-financial outcomes such as health, food security,
nutrition, education, women’s empowerment, housing, job creation, and social cohesion (Afrane,
2002; Barnes, 1996; Barnes and Keogh, 1999; Beck et al., 2004; Hietalahti and Linden, 2006;
Hossain and Knight, 2008; Khandker, 2001; Odell, 2010; Schuler et al., 1997; Wright, 2000).
In Africa, explosive growth in microfinance is creating new opportunities for many house-
holds. For example, in Tanzania, Winter-Nelson and Temu (2005) found evidence that supports
the beneficial effects of access to finance for credit-constrained coffee growers. Mwakaje and
Girabi (2013) also found that smallholder farmers with access to credit realized high agricultural
1Approximately 70% of Tanzanians live below the international poverty line of USD 2 a day (World Bank, 2015).
280% of the poor and extremely poor people in Tanzania live in rural areas and depend on subsistence agriculture
for their livelihood (World Bank, 2015).
1
productivity compared to those without access to credit. Studies have also found that a lack of
access to finance can lead to poverty traps and increase levels of income inequality (Beck et al.,
2007). The underlying logic is that by providing financial services to the poor, for example in the
form of credit or savings, they manage their money, invest, acquire productive assets, increase their
skill levels, and open new businesses. Hence, economic and social structures can be transformed,
and poverty can be alleviated (Morduch, 1999).
Despite the evidence on the importance of access to financial services in fighting poverty,
in the countries where poverty prevails outreach by the microfinance institutions remains a small
percentage of the population. Globally, about 1.7 billion adults remain unbanked — without an ac-
count at a financial institution or through a mobile money provider (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2018).
Most of the unbanked adults live in SSA. While worldwide, 50% of adults have an account at a for-
mal financial institution, barely 23% of adults in SSA do so (Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2013).
Many African adults without a formal account lack access in the sense that costs are prohibitively
high, or banks and other financial institutions are located too far away, or financial services are not
available because of legal barriers, regulatory constraints, information impediments, or cultural
deterrents. The share of adults who use formal credit and savings in SSA is also low. In 2011 the
share was 4.5% and 12%, respectively which was below the worldwide average of 9% and 22%,
respectively (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015). The poor, youth, and rural residents are more likely to
report greater barriers to access to financial services in SSA (Allen et al., 2012).
In Tanzania, as in most SSA countries, access to financial services is extremely limited. Fi-
nancial service providers are estimated to serve approximately 500,000 clients, which is just 5%
of the estimated total demand in the country (Mftransparency, 2019). Thus, there appears to be a
huge unmet demand for financial services.
There are three categories of financial service providers in Tanzania: formal, semi-formal,
and informal (Figure 1.1). The formal microfinance institutions (MFIs) comprise banks that are
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licensed and supervised by the Bank of Tanzania (BoT). The financial services of the formal MFIs
are available only to a very small fraction of the population. In 2017, only 5.3% of the population
above 15 years had obtained loans from formal financial institutions (World Bank, 2018). The
lack of collateral is one of the main reasons for this. Due to limitations in the formal sector, the
microfinance sector in Tanzania relies on the semi-formal and informal sector. It is estimated that
3 million people benefit from the existing semi-formal and informal MFIs (World Bank, 2013b).
Providers of Financial Services in Tanzania
Formal MFIs Semi-formal MFIs Informal MFIs
Banks Cooperatives Village Community Banks 
(VICOBA)
Rotating Savings and Credit 
cooperatives (ROSCAS) etc.
Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs)
National Microfinance 
Bank (NMB), 
Exim Bank etc.
Savings and Credit 
Cooperatives
(SACCOs)
BRAC Tanzania 
Limited to most people due to lack of 
collaterals
Created collateral substitutes Unreliable and charge high 
interest rates
Figure 1.1: Providers of financial services in Tanzania
Source: Author, 2019
The semi-formal MFIs are legal entities registered by different government authorities, but
their businesses are either regulated by non-financial regulators (as is the case of savings and
credit cooperatives (SACCOs) or not regulated at all (as is the case of non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs). SACCOs need to register with the regional cooperative office under the Ministry of
Agriculture, Food Security, and Cooperatives (MAFC). NGOs need to register with the Registra-
tion, Insolvency, and Trusteeship Agency (RITA) and Tanzania’s ministry of foreign affairs. As of
March 2013, there were 5,559 registered SACCOs in mainland Tanzania, with 55% of those in ru-
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ral areas. They had more than 1.1 million members, representing approximately 25% of the clients
in the financial sector (including those serviced by formal and other semi-formal providers). Sim-
ilarly, 71 financial NGOs provide credit services to approximately 690,000 clients (World Bank,
2013b).
The third category of MFIs covers self-regulated informal institutions, such as savings and
credit associations (SACAs), village community banks (VICOBAs), rotating savings and credit
associations (ROSCAs), and village savings and lending associations (VSLAs). In 2011, 45.1%
of the population above 15 years in Tanzania were relying on informal credit and 28.2% on in-
formal savings services (World Bank, 2014). The consequences of relying on informal means to
manage the day to day financial needs are well documented by Collins et al. (2009). Using the
detailed information from the financial diaries of the individual, the authors provide insight into
the challenges faced by the unbanked. For instance, the financial diaries list the time and effort
spent by poor individuals to compensate for the lack of access to services such as savings accounts,
credit, and insurance. Other challenges of using informal providers include unreliability and high
interest rates. The fact that informal loans carry high interest rates is a common feature found in
many developing areas (Conning and Udry, 2007). For example, Banerjee et al. (2017) find this
to be the case in Hyderabad, India. In Tanzania, Ghana, Malawi, and Nigeria, Steel et al. (1997)
found that moneylender interest rates are at least 50 percentage points higher than formal MFIs
rates.
The consequences of relying on the informal MFIs and the difficulties of assessing the formal
MFIs make semi-formal MFIs to be of great significance in Tanzania. Their importance in Tanza-
nia is well documented in the extant literature. These include the following: (i) provide financial
services to the poor (Wangwe and Lwakatare, 2004); (ii) promote mutual support among the poor
(Maghimbi et al., 2010); (iii) contribute to financial intermediation and household savings (Qin
et al., 2013); (iv) contribute to economic growth (Qin and Ndiege, 2013); (v) provide the predom-
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inant form of external financing for small and micro enterprises (Bwana and Mwakujonga, 2013);
and (vi) reduce poverty (Kwai and Urassa, 2015).
Based on the aforementioned reasons, this study focuses on semi-formal MFIs by referring to
selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania, a non-governmental international development organiza-
tion as representative of semi-formal MFIs. BRAC Tanzania is one of the leading NGO MFIs in
terms of the number of borrowers, branch network and outstanding loans (Mftransparency, 2019;
BRAC Tanzania, 2018).
1.2 Objectives of the Study
The main objective of this study is to examine the performance of semi-formal MFIs, to offer
suggestions for their future improvement. More specifically, this study aims:
(i) To understand the financial services of the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania.
(ii) To examine the outreach and efficiency of the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania.
(iii) To assess the repayment performance of BRAC Tanzania’s group lending.
(iv) To examine the factors that determine the repayment of BRAC Tanzania’s group lending.
(v) To assess the functions of the groups used by BRAC Tanzania.
1.3 Research Questions
With the above research objectives, this study seeks to answer the following questions.
(i) What are the financial services offered by selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania?
(ii) What are the differences between the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania?
(iii) To what extent do selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania reach the poor?
(iv) Are the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania operating efficiently?
(v) What is the loan recovery rate of BRAC Tanzania’s group lending?
(vi) What are the factors that determine the repayment of BRAC Tanzania’s group lending?
(vii) What are the functions of groups used by BRAC Tanzania?
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1.4 Significance of the Study
Semi-formal MFIs remain to be an essential provider of financial services in Tanzania due to the
fact they serve the poor who have been excluded from formal MFIs by providing a wide range of
financial services such as small-sized loans and savings services. Most importantly, semi-formal
MFIs have introduced collateral substitutes. NGO MFIs have introduced group lending, in which
members form groups and guarantee each other whereas cooperative-based MFIs (SACCOs) use
savings as a collateral substitute, where members can borrow against their savings. Their progress
in Tanzania has also been notable. For example, while BRAC Tanzania began operating in Tanza-
nia in 2006, it has already established 11,321 microfinance groups, with 214,046 members (BRAC
Tanzania, 2018). Likewise, from 2005 to 2012, the annual average growth rates of the number of
SACCOs and SACCOs members were 18.9% and 25.5%, respectively (Qin et al., 2013).
Several academic studies discuss various topics regarding semi-formal MFIs, but a gap in
this area still remains in the literature. To understand this gap, an extensive review of academic
publications related to microfinance in Tanzania was conducted.3 Table 1.1 summarizes the pub-
lications.
Most publications on Tanzania semi-formal MFIs focus on the impact of financial services on
borrowers’ livelihood, business, and other aspects, such as women’s empowerment. However, the
author has found only few publications focusing on institution-side factors. For example, Chijoriga
(2015) conducts a non-empirical analysis to discuss the institutional transformation of NGO MFIs,
while Mkuu and Yusoff (2017) discuss the potential of MFIs that follow Islamic principles in
Zanzibar. Ishengoma (2015) and Jeje (2015) focus on how outreach can be improved through the
linkage between SACCOs and formal MFIs, and the development of financial products. Magali
(2013a) examines the impact of credit risk management on the profitability of semi-formal MFIs.
3The review was conducted by searching for articles of interest in three academic databases: (i) JSTOR; (ii)Science
Direct; and (iii) Google Scholar. To narrow down the search results, journals and keywords related to microfinance
were specified.
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Table 1.1: Publications related to MFIs in Tanzania
Category Publications Overviews of topics discussed
Financial sector in
general
Temu (1998). The impact of financial sector
reforms in Tanzania.
MFIs (overall) Kaleshu and Temu (2012); Kipesha (2013b);
Aloisi et al. (2002); Kuzilwa (2005); Lind-
vert et al. (2015, 2019); Salia (2014);
Satta (2004); Selejio (2015); Josephat
et al. (2017); Kipesha (2013a); Abbas
and Honghui (2016); Berge et al. (2012);
Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2010); Magali
(2018).
Evaluating the impact of mi-
crocredit on borrowers, MFIs
regulations, and government
intervention on financial ser-
vices.
Formal MFIs Chuku and Ndanshau (2017); Cull and
Spreng (2011); Clacher et al. (2006); Anand
and Jayaramaiah (2013); Kalimang’asi et al.
(2014); Makorere (2014); Satta (2006b,a);
Temu and Andilile (2015); Weber and
Musshoff (2012); Mwizarubi et al. (2015).
Policy changes, performance
evaluation, agricultural
finance, effects of technolog-
ical changes on institutions
operations, and risk manage-
ment
Semi-Formal MFIs Sigalla and Carney (2012); Chijoriga (2015);
Magali (2013a,b); Flora et al. (2015); Ka-
seva (2017); Maleko et al. (2013); Mkuu and
Yusoff (2017); Mori et al. (2017); Ngonyani
and Mapesa (2019); Ssendi and Anderson
(2009); Tundui and Tundui (2013); Ishen-
goma (2015); Jeje (2015); Kabung’a and Ma-
soud (2015).
Evaluating the impact of mi-
crocredit on borrowers, oper-
ations of MFIs on various as-
pects, determinants of loans
repayments by borrower and
linkage between Semi-Formal
MFIs and other financial sec-
tors.
Informal MFIs Kimuyu (1999); Dercon et al. (2006);
Aikaruwa et al. (2014).
Examines operations and ser-
vices offered by Informal
MFIs.
Macro-level study Abbott (1976); Aterido et al. (2013); Barry
and Tacneng (2014); Beck et al. (2013);
Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2010); de Koker
and Jentzsch (2013); del Puerto Soria et al.
(2019); Fisman (2001); Gallardo et al.
(2005); Marr and Tubaro (2011b, 2013); Mi-
nani (2013); Nyanzu et al. (2019); Steel et al.
(1997); Tehulu (2013).
Cross-country comparison of
operations, performance and
regulations of financial insti-
tutions, comparative reviews
of impact evaluations studies.
Source: Author (2020).
Another publication that focuses on the institutional side is Magali (2013b), which examines the
determinants of repayment of SACCOs by using institutional factors.
Therefore, to the best of the author’s knowledge, there are no studies on Tanzania semi-formal
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MFIs that focus on both SACCOs and NGOs using institutional and members’ data to assess
the performance of these institutions. Another unique aspect of this study is that it uses various
performance indicators, such as outreach, efficiency, repayment performance, and its determinants.
By examining the performance of semi-formal MFIs in Tanzania, this study aims to offer sug-
gestions on their future improvement and contribute to the knowledge of the microfinance sector
in Tanzania and other developing countries. In discussing the performance, this study considers
the differences in the selected semi-formal MFIs in Tanzania.
1.5 Methods of the Study
1.5.1 Primary data
The primary data were collected from field surveys conducted during different periods between
2015 and 2019. Observations, interviews, and questionnaires were used in the data collection.
Observations were done on how BRAC Tanzania group meetings are conducted, how repayments
are collected, and other group aspects. The interviews and questionnaires were conducted with
various BRAC Tanzania and SACCO’s key informants and BRAC Tanzania members. The data
collection schedule was as follows:
January to March 2015
The interview was conducted with BRAC Tanzania regional manager for Arusha. The information
from this interview covered the BRAC Tanzania mission, business characteristics (e.g., target
clients and services provided), and details on credit service specifics such as the type of loan, loan
amount, annual interest rates, and loan duration.
In the case of SACCOs, the interview was conducted with the assistant registrar of coopera-
tive for the Arusha region. The purpose was to understand the status and the challenges faced by
SACCOs in the Arusha region. Also, interviews were conducted with officers and leaders of se-
lected SACCOs. The purpose was to understand the selected SACCOs mission, an overview of the
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current situation, target clients, type of loans offered, interest rates, credit terms, and challenges.
December 2017 to April 2018
Interviews with key informants of BRAC Tanzania, including microfinance program manager,
Arusha regional manager, area managers, branch managers, and community organizers was con-
ducted. The interviews were on different aspects of group lending, including characteristics of the
groups, group operations, and repayment. Questionnaires were administered to 177 members of
ten randomly selected groups. Several questions were asked regarding socioeconomic character-
istics, loan amounts, loan uses, and repayment.
March to August 2019
Interviews were conducted with different staff, including BRAC Tanzania microfinance program
manager, Arusha regional manager, area managers, branch managers, and community organizers.
The interviews focused on different aspects of BRAC Tanzania’s group lending program. With the
help of an enumerator, questionnaires were administered to 183 randomly selected groups. Ques-
tions were about the functions of the groups (peer screening, peer monitoring, and peer pressure)
the existence of social ties, group characteristics and repayment.
1.5.2 Secondary data
The secondary data was obtained from books, government reports, websites, BRAC Tanzania
reports, selected SACCOs reports and several journal publications. Books which were used in-
clude Sustainable Banking with the Poor, an Institutional and Financial Perspective, The New Mi-
crofinance Handbook; A Financial Market System Perspective, The Handbook of Microfinance,
Portfolio of the Poor, The Microfinance Revolution, The Poor and Their Money, The Economics
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of Microfinance, Freedom from Want, Disciplinary Technologies of Microfinance Institutions in
Bangladesh a Comparison of BRAC and BRDB Programs, and Finance Against Poverty.
The National Bureau of Statistics and Bank of Tanzania reports were used. Some information
was obtained from the following websites: https://www.ushirika.go.tz, https:// www. bot.go.tz,
http://www.brac.net, and https://www.kilimo.go.tz. Publications from journals about microfinance,
group lending, performance of MFIs and related topics were revised.
Other secondary data for the case of BRAC Tanzania was obtained from country headquarters
and regional office. The data include; trend reports, members’ admission reports, overdue reports,
and other reports. For the case of SACCOs, data on a list of all SACCOs in the Arusha region,
their registration dates, types, and their outstanding loan amounts were obtained from the assistant
registrar of cooperative at Arusha regional office. The financial statements were obtained from the
selected SACCOs offices.
1.5.3 Data analysis
For the analysis of the performance of semi-formal microfinance institutions, descriptive and em-
pirical analyses were done. The details of the analyses are presented in the specific chapters.
1.6 Definitions and History of Microfinance
1.6.1 Definitions of microfinance
Several authors have defined the term microfinance, and below are some of the definitions. Ledger-
wood (1999) defined microfinance as a development approach that provides financial and social
intermediation. The financial intermediation includes the provision of savings, credit, and insur-
ance services, while social intermediation involves services such as group formation, development
of self-confidence, training in financial literacy, and management capabilities among members of
a group.
According to Robinson (2001), microfinance refers to small-scale financial services—primarily
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credit and savings— provided to people who farm or fish or herd; who operate small enterprises
or microenterprises where goods are produced, recycled, repaired, or sold; who provide services;
who work for wages or commissions; who gain income from renting out small amounts of land,
vehicles, draft animals, or machinery and tools; and to other individuals and groups at the lo-
cal levels of developing countries, both rural and urban. Meyer (2014) defined microfinance as
small-size transactions and products specifically designed for low-income households and small-
scale businesses, often concentrated in urban or densely populated rural areas, but increasingly
penetrating more rural locations. According to the CGAP (2019), microfinance refers to financial
services for poor and low-income clients. Karlan et al. (2011) defined microfinance (i.e., micro-
credit) as the provision of small-scale financial services to people who lack access to traditional
banking services. In their definition, they added that microfinance implies very small loans to
low-income clients for self-employment, often with the simultaneous collection of small amounts
of savings.
The above definitions differ in some senses, but they all touch upon some of the important
features of microfinance which are access to financial services beyond credit such as savings and
insurance to low-income household and small business which cannot easily have access to tradi-
tional financial services. In addition to above definitions, Karlan et al. (2011) mentioned nine tradi-
tional features of microfinance which are: (1) small transactions and minimum balances (whether
loans, savings, or insurance) (2) loans for entrepreneurial activity (3) collateral-free loans (4) group
lending (5) focus on poor clients (6) focus on female clients (7) simple application processes (8)
provision of services in underserved communities (9) market-level interest rates.
This study employs Robinson (2001) and Karlan et al. (2011) definitions that microfinance is
the provision of small-scale financial services mainly credits and savings to the people who lack
access to traditional banking services. This is because the provision of other financial services
such as insurance is seldom conducted by semi-formal MFIs in Tanzania.
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Institutions that provide financial services are known as MFIs. MFIs may also offer other
services as a means of improving the ability of its clients to utilize financial services. Most MFIs
offer social intermediation to some extent (Ledgerwood, 1999). They also include a wide range
of providers that vary in their legal structure, mission, and methodology (Jasmina and Meritxell,
2012).
1.6.2 A brief history of microfinance
Microfinance began as a series of small-scale lending experiments in the villages of Bangladesh in
the 1970s—associated in particular with the Grameen Bank.4 Economics professor and Grameen
founder, Muhammed Yunus, and his students were trying a social experiment on a category of
people deemed ineligible for credit by formal lenders—women involved in a variety of cottage
industries, who needed loans for their raw materials. The surprisingly positive results of this
experiment, especially in terms of repayment rates, paved the way for the microfinance model
(Yunus, 2008).
In its original vision, microfinance entailed providing small loans for productive purposes.
The core of microfinance was group, where borrowers at most MFIs were organized into groups
of five to ten members. Lending was based on joint liability—or the idea that a second member
of the group could not get a loan until the first paid back, thereby creating an incentive for “peer
monitoring” (as first described by Stiglitz in 1990). Groups have served a crucial social purpose in
the functioning of microfinance as an institution, and it has been a subject of extended academic
debate.
By the 1980s, microfinance had become well known in development circles. The Grameen
and BRAC alone extended loans to several million borrowers. The success of pioneers leads
4The roots of microfinance can be found in many places, but the best-known story is that of Mohammad Yunus
and the founding of Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). However, several studies show
BRAC microfinance program starts before that of Grameen Bank (Smillie, 2009; Todaro and Smith, 2011; Hussain,
2015). By the end of 1976, when Grameen Bank started, BRAC was already five years old. It had formed more than 75
cooperatives and smaller experimental groups of borrowers and provided loans of more than one million taka (Smillie,
2009).
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to replications around the world. Grameen currently lends to approximately 8.4 million women
and has replicas in eighty-four different countries, while BRAC boasts 7 million borrowers in
Bangladesh alone and a global reach of over 100 million (Haldar and Stiglitz, 2016).
Through the 1990s, microfinance emerged as one of the—if not the—most important develop-
ment programs on the horizon. The widespread was due to support by international organizations
such as the United Nations and the World Bank. Recognition of microfinance came in 2006 when
Yunus and the Grameen Bank were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, leading Yunus to com-
ment that microfinance would put “poverty in museums.”
1.7 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into seven chapters including the present one. This chapter, Chapter 1, has
set the background of the study. The chapter began by explaining the poverty situation around the
world, SSA and Tanzania. It also explains the importance of access to financial services in fighting
poverty. In explaining the importance of access to financial services, it also stresses how access
to financial services is limited in SSA and Tanzania. The objectives, research questions, and the
significance of the study are also discussed here.
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the providers of financial services in Tanzania. It started by
giving the historical background of the current MFIs and brief overview of the financial reforms of
the 1980s. This chapter also presents the general overview of formal, semi-formal, and informal
MFIs in Tanzania. In discussing the formal MFIs, the chapter explains the bank and nonbank
financial services providers and challenges that limit access to formal microfinance institutions in
Tanzania. It also discusses semi-formal MFIs separately as SACCOs and NGOs, followed by the
discussion of informal MFIs. Lastly, it offers explanation of BRAC and its replication in other
countries mainly in Tanzania.
Chapter 3 explains the profile of the study area, which is the Arusha region, one of the 31
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administrative regions in Tanzania. The chapter explains the basic information of Arusha region
including population, major economic activities in the region, the contribution of the region to
the national GDP, the status of SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania in the region, their growth and the
challenges in the region.
Chapter 4 examines the performance of the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania by focus-
ing on outreach, as well as efficiency in terms of operating costs. The chapter starts by explaining
the financial services of the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania, followed by outreach in terms
of the expansion of credit and then efficiency. In discussing the efficiency, descriptive and empiri-
cal analyses are presented.
Chapter 5 discusses the repayment performance of group lending using the case of BRAC
Tanzania. The chapter begins with a literature review on the origins of groups, advantages and
disadvantages of the groups. This is followed by characteristics of BRAC Tanzania group lend-
ing programs, group formation and peer selection, group member’s characteristics and loan use
based on the field survey. Finally, the repayment performance of BRAC Tanzania’s microfinance
program is discussed.
Chapter 6 presents empirical evidence on the determinants of repayment performance in
BRAC Tanzania group lending. It presents a literature review on the determinants of the re-
payment performance. The descriptive and empirical analysis results of the determinants of the
repayment performance of BRAC Tanzania group lending are discussed.
Chapter 7 provides the conclusion of this study and offers policy implications for the future
improvement of the financial sector in Tanzania. It also highlights the limitations of the study and
areas for future research.
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Chapter 2.
An Overview of the Financial Sector in Tanzania
2.1 Historical Background
The history of current microfinance institutions in Tanzania is closely linked to the emergence
of saving associations and credit cooperatives societies in early 1965. By that time, savings and
credit cooperatives were associated with agriculture cooperative societies. In this regard, they
were very prominent in the areas where agriculture was the main economic activity. The saving
associations and credit cooperatives, however, suffered from serious funding problems and finan-
cial mismanagement. This was partly caused by political influence and interference. As a result,
the mainstream banking system was the only provider of financial services throughout the country.
The banking system, however, could not provide small scale financial services demanded by the
poor. The scope of their services and geographical coverage was also limited. This resulted in the
reliance on informal financial services by most of Tanzanians (Nyamsogoro, 2010).
In the 1980s, Tanzania embarked on financial reforms. The financial reforms were aiming
at, among others, improving access to financial services by all sectors previously excluded by
financial service providers. The financial sector reforms included, among others, liberalization
of interest rates, eliminating administrative credit allocation, and strengthening the Bank of Tan-
zania’s role in regulating and supervising financial institutions. The reforms were also meant to
restructure state-owned financial institutions and to allow the entry of private financial institutions
in the market (Nord et al., 2009). However, following the restructuring of state-owned financial
institutions and privatizations of the National Bank of Commerce (NBC) and the Cooperative
and Rural Development Bank (CRDB), 78 branches were closed throughout the country most of
which were in the rural areas leaving rural areas without reliable financial services (Satta, 2002;
Steel et al., 1997).
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In the early 1990s, the evolution of MFIs, as financial intermediaries for the poor and their ad-
vocacy as a poverty reduction tool around the world, created hope of having financial services, es-
pecially in the rural areas. Inspired by success stories from microfinance institutions like Grameen
Bank in Bangladesh, in 2000, the government, in collaboration with the donor community, started
to implement a rural financial program to reinstate the rural financial services, which gave rise
to the current savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs). NGOs also started to enter the market
as the microfinance provider due to the supply gap created by the banking system. It has been
reported that member-based MFIs (i.e., SACCOs) and several donors assisted NGOs are principal
providers of microfinance services in Tanzania (Randhawa and Gallardo, 2003).
2.2 Classification of Microfinance Institutions in Tanzania
2.2.1 Formal microfinance institutions
Formal microfinance institutions are institutions that are licensed, registered, subjected to laws,
banking regulation, and supervision of the Bank of Tanzania. The formal microfinance institutions
mainly comprise of banks.1 The bank sector in Tanzania is still small and at a relatively nascent
stage of development. As of 2017, there was a total of 54 banks and 29 were foreign owned. The
rest were domestic owned (18 banks) and government owned (7 banks). Commercial banks hold
95.7% of all the assets in the bank sector, with the rest held by two development banks, seven
community banks, and five microfinance banks. Commercial banks also hold the largest share of
the bank assets to GDP (24.7%) (IMF, 2018).
In Tanzania’s formal financial system, there are also non-bank financial service providers.
These include insurance companies, pension funds, and collective investment schemes. As of
2017, there were 31 insurance companies, six pension funds which merged in two institutions in
2018, and five collective investment schemes (Table 2.1).
In addition to the above mentioned formal financial institutions, mobile financial services
122 banks are offering microfinance services (Ministry of Finance, 2019).
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Table 2.1: Formal financial institutions in Tanzania
Institutions Number Assets Percentage Percentage Percentage
of in billion of total of total of
institution TShs bank assets assets GDP
Banks
Commercial banks 40 28,635 95.7 68.6 24.7
Community banks 7 156 0.5 0.4 0.1
Development banks 2 935 3.1 2.2 0.8
Microfinance banks 5 184 0.6 0.4 0.2
Total 54 29,910 100.0 71.6 25.8
Non-bank financial institutions
Insurance companies 31 870 2.1 0.7
Pension funds 6 10,745 25.7 9.3
Collective Investment schemes 5 249 0.6 0.2
Total financial system 41,774 100.0 36.0
Source: Compiled by author using reports from Bank of Tanzania (2019).
Notes:
1. Data is as of December 2017, insurance companies’ data is as of June 2017, and pension funds data is
as of September 2017.
2. Commercial banks include Akiba Commercial Bank (ACB), National Bank of Commerce (NBC),
Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB), Exim Bank (Tanzania), CRDB, and Citi Bank. Community banks
include Mufindi Community Bank (MUCOBA), and Mwanga Rural Community Bank. Development
banks include Tanzania Agricultural Development Bank (TADB) and TIB Development Bank.
Microfinance banks include EFC Tanzania Microfinance Bank and FINCA Microfinance Bank.
3. Pension funds include six mandatory social security funds.
4. GDP here refers to the nominal GDP in 2017, which was TShs 116.16 trillion.
(mobile banking and mobile money) are also regarded as a gateway to access formal financial ser-
vices. Mobile banking is the capacity of an account holder or client to access their bank accounts
and financial services through mobile devices. On the other hand, mobile money refers to the ca-
pacity to transfer or receive a unit of account (credits) between mobile devices to make payments
for purchases of goods or services, or in the payment of obligations. While mobile banking is an
extension of banking services and therefore linked to a formal financial institution, mobile money
can be provided by a mobile network operator (MNO), a bank, or combination of the two (Aron
et al., 2017).
Before the use of mobile financial services, Tanzania had one of the highest rates of financial
exclusion in SSA. Mobile payments (service offered by MNO) have made a significant impact in
facilitating access to financial services, particularly payment services (person to person) to most of
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the population which are unbanked. The World Bank’s global financial inclusion (global findex)
database suggests that while only about 19% of adults had a bank account at a formal financial
institution in 2014 from 17.3% in 2011, the proportion doubles to 39.8% when mobile accounts
are included. The number rose to 46.8% in 2017 when mobile accounts are taken into account
(Table 2.2).
Table 2.2: Access to formal financial institutions in Tanzania(% of aged 15+)
Use of formal financial institution 2011 2014 2017
Formal financial institution account
Tanzania 17.3 19.0 21.0
SSA 23.2 28.8 32.8
Mobile money account
Tanzania 32.4 38.5
SSA 11.6 20.9
Account*
Tanzania 17.3 39.8 46.8
SSA 23.2 34.2 42.6
Credit
Tanzania 6.6 6.7 5.3
SSA 7.5 8.4
Saving
Tanzania 11.9 9.0 6.1
SSA 15.8 14.9
Source: World Bank (2018).
Notes:
1. Percentage of aged 15+ is the percent of respondents aged above 15 years who had formal account,
mobile account, obtained loan or saved at formal financial institution at the end of 2017.
2. The population above 15+ years old in Tanzania is equivalent to 30.5 million people as of 2017.
3. Account* refers to ownership of both formal financial institution and mobile money account.
4. Credit refers to borrow at a formal financial institution or use a credit card.
5. Data of 2011 on account ownership did not consider mobile money.
Despite the recent improvement in access to formal financial services mostly contributed by
mobile financial services, several challenges remained, which limits access to formal microfinance
institutions in Tanzania. First, the competitive landscape for mobile and traditional financial ser-
vices does not facilitate the gradual upgrading of customers from transaction services to savings
and credit services, which remains the domain of the banking sector. Second, the formal bank-
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ing sector serves a very small group of individuals and companies. Tanzania ranks at the bottom
among East African Community (EAC) for measures of firms’ access to credit and other financial
services. In the 2013 World Bank global enterprise survey, almost 44% of the firms identified
access to finance as a major constraint, the highest proportion in the EAC (World Bank, 2013a).
Third, access to financial infrastructure and branch penetration is still poor. Fourth, interest rates
remain high, and access to credit very restricted. This is evidenced by the ratio of credit to the
private sector over GDP. This ratio stands at less than 15 percent, a very low level compared to
other emerging economies and less than half the level of the neighboring country of Kenya (36 per-
cent). Fifth, high collateral requirements negatively impact entrepreneurs with insufficient fixed
assets, particularly women. Lastly, high loan costs, and short tenures, which are not suitable for
investment purposes. Consequently, only 13% of small formal enterprises have a bank loan (World
Bank, 2017).
2.3 Semi-formal Microfinance Institutions
2.3.1 Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs)
SACCOs (also known as credit unions) are member-based financial institutions, also known as
cooperative-based microfinance institutions designed to capture and intermediate the savings of
local communities or organized groups who feel they are underserved by the more mainstream
financial sector. SACCOs are owned by their members, which means that members have a vested
interest in actively ensuring that the SACCO is run along with sound principles (Beck and Maimbo,
2012).
Historically SACCOs were developed to meet financial services, specifically savings and
credits, to support the lower and middle class so that they become economically active. This
can be referred from the founders of savings and credit societies in Germany, Friederich W. Raif-
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feisen and Herman Scheultze–Delitsche in 1846. Currently, SACCOs are growing fast in Africa
and Tanzania in particular (Temu and Ishengoma, 2010; Bee, 2007; Lafourcade et al., 2005).
In Tanzania, SACCOs originated as early as 1938 in several parts of the country; by 1964,
there were 41 registered SACCOs (Bee, 2007). SACCOs in Tanzania are registered by the reg-
istrar of cooperatives and managed under cooperative policy and law. Therefore, the government
through the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Cooperatives indirectly controls these cooperatives
through cooperative department. This is important as it ensures that cooperatives fulfil their ob-
jectives of improving the lives of poor people through proper reallocations of scarce resources. In
2013, the parliament approved the new cooperative bill in order to foster the advance operation of
cooperative societies in Tanzania. The new law will enable cooperatives and SACCOs to become
more independent and creative.
Characteristics of SACCOs in Tanzania
1. They are registered under the Cooperative Societies Act 2013 at the regional cooperative
office. At the local government level, registration is supervised by a district cooperative
officer (DCO). To be registered, SACCOs must have a minimum of 20 members and a
minimum capital of TShs 5 million.
2. They are formed, owned and operated by members based on democratic principles. Clients
tend to come from low and middle-income groups (Marwa and Aziakpono, 2015; Bwana
and Mwakujonga, 2013).
3. They are created based on a common bond like occupation, association, residential, and
others.
4. They are two main types of SACCOs; community-based and employed based. Community-
based SACCOs can be found in urban areas but are most frequently found in rural areas.
A variety of loans are offered including business and emergency loans. Employee-based
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SACCOs represent SACCOs where all the members are drawn from one employer, and
these SACCOs are generally located in urban areas. In employee-based SACCOs, loans are
often guaranteed by the employer (Bwana and Mwakujonga, 2013).
5. They are available in all parts of the country, especially in rural areas where formal financial
institutions are not easily accessible. 56% of SACCOs in Tanzania are in rural areas, and
44% are in urban areas (Ministry of Agriculture, 2019). In urban areas, members are mostly
salary and wage earners, while rural areas members are mainly farmers.
6. To be a member, a person needs to pay membership fees and contribute shares. The mem-
bership fees and number of shares differs from one SACCO to another but normally, all
SACCOs members have to pay fees and buy shares as a way of showing readiness to coop-
erate.
7. SACCOs member needs to save first and borrow from his/her savings. Member can borrow
up to three times of his/her total investment (through saving or/and shares), although some
SACCOs limit borrowings to twice the member’s total investment (Marwa and Aziakpono,
2015).
8. Apart from saving and loan services to members, SACCOs offer deposits to members and
non-members. Those linked to formal MFIs offer automatic teller machine (ATM) services,
money transfer, payments of salaries and pensions to members and non-members (Ishen-
goma, 2012).
9. They depend on internal sources of funds which are contributed by members in the form of
shares, demand deposits (voluntary savings) and savings (compulsory savings). Apart from
the internal sources of funds, SACCOs get funds from external sources mainly borrowing
from formal financial institutions particularly commercial banks, government and donors
(Nyamsogoro, 2010; Marwa and Aziakpono, 2015).
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Significance of SACCOs in Tanzania
1. SACCOs have solved the problem of capital inadequacy for the clients who were not served
by commercial banks and other formal financial institutions because they offer small amount
of loans without demanding the collateral.
2. SACCOs have reach clients in marginalized areas, especially in rural areas. Therefore, they
remain to be the semi-formal financial institutions that provide small loans to many members
in rural areas of Tanzania. About 5% of Tanzanians are served by SACCOs and credit only
institutions (Bank of Tanzania, 2012).
3. They mobilize savings from low-income earners and poor people, especially in rural areas
that could not have reached by formal financial institutions (Bee, 2007; Kessy and Urio,
2006; Ellis et al., 2007).
4. Savings mobilized by SACCOs is relevant in many ways. Their relevance includes the
following; first, they are the means to identify potential members as they show willingness
of a person to be a member. Second, they act as collateral to members. Third, savings is an
important financial service required by poor people and source of cheap loans to the member,
which is basically required by low-income people. On top of these, savings is important in
building internal capacity for an individual and SACCOs as an institution (Okumu, 2007).
5. SACCOs are essential for the growth of the economy and small and medium enterprises.
They contribute about 40% of the country’s GDP (Bwana and Mwakujonga, 2013; Qin and
Ndiege, 2013).
6. Apart from business, agricultural loans, education, and development loans, emergency loans
are among the priorities of SACCOs in Tanzania (Ishengoma, 2012).
7. The impacts of SACCOs are reflected in the ability of members to use their accumulated
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savings to pay for school fees, acquire modern housing facilities and to spend on social
emergencies such as sickness (Ishengoma, 2012).
8. SACCOs are used by the government and development partners to implement some eco-
nomic and social development programs (Ishengoma, 2012).
Expansion and challenges of SACCOs in Tanzania
Generally, there has been progress in the development of SACCOs in the country, although there
have been some challenges as well. As in Table 2.3 below, there was an abrupt and continuous
growth of SACCOs in terms of number of the SACCOs, members, shares, savings, and loans
disbursed from 2006 to 2009. This was mainly caused by deliberate efforts of the 4th phase
government to promote the formation of SACCOs through providing them with funds. After 2009
there was a stagnation in the SACCOs growth, which was thereafter followed by decrease in the
number of SACCOs as a result of deregistration to have sustainable SACCOs. A good example is
the trend seen from the year 2009 to 2010 (Ministry of Agriculture, 2011).
This happened because some of the SACCOs were formed in a rush and without having proper
roots, especially after the government announced to provide them with grant funds; therefore, they
collapsed just a short period of time after they were established. Some SACCOs are still struggling
to survive, while others have exited the market. According to TCDC report in 2018, 35% and 16%
of the SACCOs and SACCOs members, respectively were not active.
SACCOs in Tanzania also face problems of financial constraints, poor loan recovery, gover-
nance problems, lack of common interests, weak leadership and institutional capacity, inadequate
education and training, limited range of financial products and poor quality services, poor account-
ing and record keeping, misuse of funds and non-adherence to cooperative principles, competition,
negative impacts of external financing, weak assistance from SACCOs supporting institutions, in-
sufficient auditing and inspection, political interference and excessive donor dependency (Anania
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and Gikuri, 2015; Bibi, 2006; Maghimbi et al., 2010; Triodosfacet, 2007; Marr and Tubaro, 2011a;
Karumuna and Akyoo, 2011; Ishengoma, 2012).
The possible impacts of such challenges are; poor provision of financial services, loss mem-
bers funds, poor participation and commitment of members, withdrawal of members and members
using services of other financial institutions, failure to face competition, internal conflicts, loss of
SACCOs autonomy and excessive external dependency as well as feeling of lacking ownership
and control by SACCOs members (Anania and Gikuri, 2015).
Table 2.3: The growth of SACCOs in Tanzania from 1990-2012
Year Number of
SACCOs
Number of
members
Shares
(Mil.TShs)
Savings and
deposits
(Mil. TShs)
Loans issued
(Mil. TShs)
1990 89 15,225 1,346 1,032 30
1991 156 19,884 1,527 1,424 48
1992 198 23,017 1,746 1,626 109
1993 289 45,889 1,926 1,987 112
1994 306 68,993 2,105 2,896 134
1995 306 73,218 2,564 3,001 1,586
1996 306 76,113 2,896 3,114 1,979
1997 514 79,645 3,119 3,569 2,064
1998 769 98,762 3,416 5,114 2,190
1999 825 125,880 5,569 8,336 13,211
2000 803 133,134 5,618 8,426 11,524
2001 927 137,305 6,610 8,599 12,362
2002 974 189,497 7,856 8,791 18,227
2003 982 245,633 8,956 9,996 28,966
2004 1104 781,162 12,590 19,046 36,922
2005 1875 255,938 13,170 31,394 54,140
2006 2028 291,344 13,116 39,535 34,341
2007 3469 590,163 18,240 59,715 115,107
2008 4524 758,828 24,218 114,022 220,272
2009 5332 820,670 33,530 148,145 383,564
2010 5251 919,411 32,871 204,000 539,279
2011 5314 1,552,242 81,601 447,665 741,050
2012 5424 1,059,213 54,968 354,977 703,286
Sources: Compiled from Tanzania SACCOs statistical reports; Mwakajumilo (2011) and Ndiege
et al. (2016).
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2.3.2 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
NGOs are nonprofit organizations that provide social and economic services, which may include
health or education or microfinance, among other services. A significant number of NGOs provide
microfinance services to low-income households in Tanzania. They mostly use group lending
method in which group members guarantee loan repayment. They also have few individual-based
lending where the collateral is needed. The NGO MFIs in Tanzania are not allowed to mobilize
savings.
However, some NGO MFIs require their clients to have minimum savings as loan insurance
funds. Most loans provided are for business purposes, but they provide loans for other purposes,
such as education. Most of NGO MFIs have a graduation scheme in which clients can graduate
from small loans to larger loans depending on repayment history on previous loans (Nyamsogoro,
2010). Some of the NGO MFIs in Tanzania include BRAC Tanzania, Association for Social
Advancement (ASA), and Youth Self Employment Foundation (YOSEFO).
This study focuses on BRAC Tanzania as the case study; therefore, section 2.6 below pro-
vides background and profile of BRAC and its replication in other countries. In addition, BRAC
Tanzania profile and microfinance program administrative structure is explained.
2.4 Informal Microfinance Institutions
There is various kind of informal MFIs in Tanzania which offer loans and savings services. These
include; ROSCAs, ASCA, VSLAs, and VICOBAs. In ROSCAs, locally known as upatu or
mchezo, members make weekly or regular savings of the same amount each week. In turn, one
member of the group takes the total amount saved by the group. The group varies in the value of
the payment, the number of the members, and the frequency of the meetings. In ASCAs, mem-
bers make regular savings and borrow against an accumulating fund. After an agreed period, the
fund and profit are distributed to members. VSLAs and VICOBAs are the improved versions of
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ROSCAs and ASCAs, and they are close to credit cooperatives. Members buy shares, and they
can borrow and save. At the end of each year, the books are closed, and funds are shared among
members.
Most VSLAs divide both share capital and profit (from interest and penalties) to its members,
while VICOBAs divide only the profit. Due to the complexity in accounts, member information
is recorded in passbooks or ledger, although it is difficult to prepare quarterly accounts and keep
up to date (Brown et al., 2015). Some of VSLAs and VICOBAs have been established by the
government, NGOs, and the private sector. Care International has been instrumental in setting
up many VSLAs, while 34% of the VICOBAs have been established and supported by programs
funded by development partners such as Plan International, World Vision, CARE International,
Norwegian Church Aid and others and 66% have been established by members. There are more
than 23,000 VICOBAs with more than 700,000 members and approximately 32,000 and 750,000
VSLAs and VSLAs members, respectively (URT, 2016; Brown et al., 2015).
2.5 Summary of Microfinance Institutions in Tanzania
Table 2.4 below summarizes the characteristics of three categories of MFIs in Tanzania. This
study focuses on the semi-formal MFIs because semi-formal MFIs features suit most of Tanzani-
ans especially the poor. These include; small loan size, no or minimum collateral requirements,
existence in rural areas and reliability. They also charge relatively lower interest rates than those
charged by informal MFIs.
2.6 BRAC
BRAC was founded in 1972 by Fazle Hasan Abed at Sulla in the Sylhet district. It began as an
acronym, standing for Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee. In the beginning, BRAC
works in response to the humanitarian needs of thousands of refugees returning to their homes
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Table 2.4: Characteristics of formal, semi-formal and informal MFIs in Tanzania
Characteristics Formal MFI Semi-Formal MFIs Informal MFIS
Examples Banks SACCOs and NGOs VICOBA and ROSCAs
Target clients High income Low and middle-income Low-income
Geographical concentration Urban areas Rural areas Rural areas
Collateral Usually Sometimes No
Loan sizes Large Small and medium Small
Loan term All terms Short and medium term Short term
Loan processing procedures Very complex Complex Simple
Interest rates Varies Varies High
Reliability Highly reliable Reliable Unreliable
Terms Rigid Less rigid Flexible
Deposits Yes Sometimes Sometimes
Notes:
1. The formal and semi-formal MFIs in Tanzania charge reasonable interest rates compared to the informal
MFIs. Interest rates charged by formal and semi-formal MFIs tend to vary between 16 and 40% per year.
Although some literature argues these rates are still high, however, there are below the rates charged by
informal MFIs. For example, the interest rates charged by VSALs are 60% per year.
2. Reliability refers to the delivery of products and services at the promised time, in the promised amount,
and at the promised price.
after Bangladesh’s war of independence. By 1974, BRAC had begun providing microcredit. The
program targeted individuals owning very little land and involved in rural nonfarm activities such
as door to door sales and small-scale vending from homes or markets. While BRAC microcre-
dit program has been widely replicated in other countries, none operate on Bangladesh’s scale.
Currently, BRAC works in most of the country’s 80,000 villages through a system of 14 training
centers and over 2,800 branch offices, with a budget of approximately half a billion USD. By some
measures, BRAC is now the largest NGO in the world (Todaro and Smith, 2011).
2.6.1 BRAC beyond Bangladesh
BRAC is now exporting experience, expertise, and values to other countries to assist with poverty
reduction efforts. In 2018, BRAC reached around 600,000 women in six countries in Africa
and Asia through microfinance programs (BRAC, 2018). With its expansion to other countries,
the name of the organization has been simplified to BRAC and ceased to be an acronym and
became a motto instead, “building resources across communities.” BRAC Afghanistan was the
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first of BRAC’s international initiatives that focused on relief and rehabilitation programs. In
2002, BRAC’s assistance followed and now includes services in microfinance, health, education,
income generation, and small enterprise development in 23 out of 34 provinces of Afghanistan.
Today, BRAC is the largest NGO in Afghanistan, operating not just in the safe northern areas, but
in the embattled provinces of the south (Smillie, 2009). In 2005 BRAC was invited to help Sri
Lanka get back on its feet after the devastating tsunami tidal waves. The entry into Pakistan in late
2006 brings the total of south Asian countries to four.
In Africa, BRAC is working in Tanzania and Uganda and has expanded its effort to include
Southern Sudan along with Sierra Leone and Liberia in order to help the citizens rebuild their lives
after decades of destructive civil wars. In 2019, BRAC started microfinance program in Rwanda,
making it the fifth country in the African continent. Today, BRAC Uganda, Sierra Leone, and
Tanzania are one of the largest NGOs in the countries working in microfinance, education, health,
and agriculture. As of 2018, BRAC microfinance programs had disbursed 221.6 million USD to
495,937 borrowers in four African countries (Tanzania, Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Liberia) (Table
2.5).
There were some challenges in adapting the BRAC model to Africa. BRAC’s success in
Bangladesh revolves around the homogeneity of Bangladesh society, culture, language, and reli-
gion. In Uganda alone, there are 26 different ethnic groups, which means there must be a great deal
of adaptation. The common culture, religion, and language that helped replication in Bangladesh
do not exist. Making the connections between borrowers, the key to BRAC success in Bangladesh
would take time. However, the low cost of BRAC’s activities in Africa is remarkable; Smillie
(2009) described the case of Tanzania on how BRAC saves money while maintaining quality. He
stressed that BRAC’s staff costs are tiny in comparison to other international NGOs because all
staff lives together in shared accommodation, and they do not bring their families with them. They
get sizable premiums for working abroad and home leave every six months, but they are still paid
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based on their Bangladesh salaries.
Table 2.5: BRAC microfinance programs in African countries
Country Establishment
year
Number of
branches
Number of
borrowers
Outstanding loans
(Mil. USD)
Tanzania 2006 146 192,172 91.4
Uganda 2006 158 218,598 105.5
Liberia 2008 26 34,297 11.5
Sierra Leone 2008 33 45,870 13.2
Total 363 490,937 221.6
Source: BRAC Tanzania (2018)
2.6.2 BRAC Tanzania
In 2006, Gates Foundation provided a grant of USD 15 million, which took BRAC to Tanzania.
In Tanzania, BRAC started with agriculture, followed by health and microfinance programs. The
microfinance program started in Dar es Salaam and Arusha region, each with five branches focuses
mainly on women. By May 2007, BRAC had organized 630 groups in seven regions with a total
of 17,000 members. Eighteen months later, there were more than 80,000 members and 3,000
groups. BRAC Tanzania had opened 30 branch offices, and, by the beginning of 2009, it had
disbursed USD 22.3 million in loans. Most of the lending was to women wanting to add to an
existing enterprise of some sort, for example, more chickens, better shop, or a new sewing machine
(Smillie, 2009).
As of 2018, through its two major credit programs, microfinance program (MF) and small
enterprise program (SEP), BRAC Tanzania disbursed 73.1 and USD 10.2 million to 165,520 and
6,797 borrowers, respectively, of whom 96% are women.2 BRAC Tanzania also provides credit
to youth through Empowerment and Livelihood for Adolescents program (ELA), Adolescents
Development Program (ADP), and to smallholder farmers through agricultural finance programs.
2Microfinance loans are for women and are delivered through groups, while enterprise loans are individual loans
targeting both male and female small-scale entrepreneurs.
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Through ELA and ADP programs, BRAC Tanzania disbursed USD 2.6 million to 6,816 borrowers.
Agrifinance program disbursed USD 5.6 million to 17,968 borrowers (BRAC Tanzania, 2018).
BRAC Tanzania continues expanding in Tanzania and reach 26 of the country’s 31 adminis-
trative regions. In 2018, it launched a new microfinance project geared at tackling unemployment
and provide access to clean energy called WeSOLVE (Women Entrepreneurship through the Solar
Value chain for Economic development in Tanzania). The project is funded by Danish interna-
tional development agency (DANIDA) and Signify Foundation and implemented in partnership
with Solar Sister (a non-profit organization that trains and supports women to deliver clean energy
to rural African communities).
There are several reasons behind BRAC’s growth and success in Tanzania. First, BRAC Tan-
zania faces little competition, particularly away from the main urban areas. Few other institutions
are offering the relatively small loans that BRAC Tanzania is offering especially outside the big
cities. Second, BRAC Tanzania products have been aimed at existing businesswomen who were
excluded from financial services. All of the BRAC Tanzania clients are operating small busi-
nesses. Thirdly, BRAC clients are not the poorest Tanzanians. Banks et al. (2019) compared the
wealth rankings of three villages where BRAC Tanzania was working and found that there were no
poorest clients in BRAC’s Tanzania groups. Lastly, loans offered suit client’s needs. Loans from
BRAC Tanzania are reported to have made a positive difference to borrower’s lives. They allowed
women to invest in a variety of businesses such as charcoal sales, chicken rearing, clothing sales,
grocery stores, tea shops, tailoring, as well as agriculture (Banks et al., 2019).
Despite its growth and success in Tanzania, BRAC is facing several challenges. Not all
branches have been able to perform well. Some are facing considerable difficulties, often make
loss and losing members. There are also challenges with microfinance products. These include
the small loan size; small increment of increase of subsequent loans; immediate repayment re-
quirements (sometimes the day after taking a loan); difficulty of recovering the security deposit;
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perceived excessive paperwork; inflexibility; not being able to transfer between branches easily;
and lack of bonuses or benefits for good customers.3 Problems of staff ethics are also common in
BRAC Tanzania. There are widespread complaints about the behavior of credit officers. The com-
plaints include extracting money from clients in return for renewing loans (forbidden by BRAC
Tanzania); not returning all the repayments collected; stealing money; taking loans out in clients’
names and then running off; making it difficult for clients to take their security deposit; and finding
numerous ways of extorting funds from clients (Brockington and Banks, 2014).
2.6.3 BRAC Tanzania microfinance program administration structure
BRAC Tanzania microfinance program (MF) has several administrative units. The lower admin-
istrative unit is the branch offices (BOs). BOs are managed by the branch managers (BMs), and
community organizers (COs) oversee the group’s activities and conducts weekly meetings to col-
lect loan repayments.4 Each branch has approximately four to six COs depending on the total
number of groups. As of October 2019, there were 151 BOs and 668 COs. Two to four branches
(depending on the geographical locations) form another administrative unit called area office (AO).
The AOs are supervised by area managers (AMs).
Recently, there was restructuring of areas offices where old AOs were divided, and new AOs
were created, which lead to an increase of AOs from 38 to 57 AOs. Two to five AOs (depending
on geographical location) form regional office (RO), and three ROs form another administrative
unit called division office (DO).5 RO is supervised by a regional manager (RM) while DO is
supervised by a senior regional manager (SRM). Country office (CO) serves as the headquarters
of all BRAC activities in Tanzania and is in the Dar es Salaam region. BRAC Tanzania senior
3Some of these issues (such as small loan size and small increment in increasing loans) are likely to reflect the
relative wealth of BRAC’s client base. Also, some of these complaints may reflect appropriate caution required before
lenders allow borrowers to take on more debt.
4All the credit officers and branch managers are Tanzanian women. They are few Tanzanian men who are employed
as accountants, regional managers, and senior staff at high management level.
5BRAC pools branches across several Tanzania regions for its own administrative purposes. In the BRAC division,
it has 13 regions; however, according to the country administrative division, BRAC Tanzania has reached a total of 26
regions as of October 2019.
31
staff including country representative (CR), country head of accounts, head of finance, head of
audits, head of human resources, and program managers (PMs) for various programs, including
microfinance work at the country office (Figure 2.1).6 These administrative units (i.e., ROs, AOs,
and BOs) are restructured with time. For example, recently Dar es Salaam region was divided into
two regions (Dar es Salaam 1 and Dar es Salaam 2), making BRAC regions 13 from formerly 12
regions. As BRAC in Tanzania expands, new ROs, BOs, and AOs are created. Also, old ROs and
AOs are divided to facilitate easy management. As the expansion continues, changes in the BRAC
Tanzania administrative units are expected.
6In every administrative unit there is an Accountant hence; Branch Accountant (BA) Area accountant (AA), Re-
gional Accountant (RA), and Divisional Accounts Manager.
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Figure 2.1: BRAC Tanzania microfinance program administrative structure
Source: BRAC Tanzania, 2019
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Chapter 3.
Profile of the Study Area
3.1 Location
This study was conducted in the Arusha region. Arusha region is one of the 31 administrative
regions located in the north-eastern part of the country. Its capital and largest city is the Arusha
city. The region is bordered by Kenya to the north, Kilimanjaro region to the east, Manyara and
Singida regions to the south and Mara and Simiyu regions to the west (Figure 3.1)
Arusha
MaraKagera
Geita
Shinyanga
Mwanza
Simiyu
Morogoro
Njombe
Iringa
Dodoma
Singida
Mbeya
Songwe
Rukwa
Katavi
Tabora
Kigoma
Ruvuma
Kilimanjaro
Manyara
Zanzibar 
Islands
Dar es Salaam
Pwani
Tanga
Lindi
Mtwara
Figure 3.1: Location of Arusha region in Tanzania
Source: Author, 2019
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3.2 Basic Information of Arusha Region
According to the 2012 census data, Arusha region had a population of 1.7 million people. The
population of Arusha region is growing at a rate of 2.7% annually, representing an increase of
about 32% over ten years period since 2002. This rate of increase is high even by Africa standards.
Arusha population is predominantly rural, with 67% of the total population living in rural areas.
Arusha region has a total of 376,336 households and average household size of 4.4 persons per
household. One third of households in Arusha region are headed by females (NBS, 2016).
The economy of Arusha region predominately relies on farming (38%) and livestock keeping
(16%). Agriculture continues to be the main economic activity for the majority of the households
in Tanzania and Arusha region where 46% of all the households in the region are engaging in
agricultural activities (NBS, 2016) (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Comparison of Arusha and Tanzania in terms of demographic characteristics
Arusha region Tanzania
Population
Total population (Million TShs) 1.7 43.6
Population growth rate (percentage) 2.7 2.7
Percentage of rural population 67.0 70.9
Percentage of urban population 33.0 29.1
Household Characteristics
Total number of households 376,336 9,026,785
Number of agriculture households 174,095 5,962,091
Average household size 4.4 4.7
Mean percentage of dependants 48.7 47.8
Percentage of female-headed households 36.7 33.5
Percentage of male headed households 62.3 66.5
Source: National Bureau of statistics reports compiled by author
Arusha region is economically important to the nation in terms of GDP per capita—TShs 2.8
million—and ranks sixth in Tanzania, after the Kilimanjaro, Dar es Salaam, Ruvuma, Iringa, and
Mbeya regions. Its contribution to the country’s national GDP in 2017 was 4.7%, making it the
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sixth-largest contributor.
The proportion of Arusha region residents that lives below the national basic needs poverty
line1, set at TShs 49,329 per adult per month based on the 2018 Household Budget Survey (HBS)
is 24.7%. Moreover, 7.6% of the Arusha region residents are extremely poor and cannot afford
to buy food to meet the minimum nutritional requirement of 2,220 kilocalories per adult per day
(URT, 2019). The HBS poverty estimates show Arusha region is below the national average of
26.4% and 8% of basic needs poverty and food poverty line, respectively. Even though, Arusha
region poverty estimates are below the national average, estimates for districts level poverty reveal
that Longido district in Arusha region is one of the districts with extreme poverty in Tanzania.
(Table 3.2)
Table 3.2: Comparison of Arusha and Tanzania in terms of economic aspects
Arusha
region
Tanzania
Main economic activities
Farmers 37.7 62.1
Livestock keepers 16.4 2.4
Service workers, shop and stall sales workers 11.4 5.8
GDP
Regional GDP (Million TShs) 5.6 118.7
Regional per capital GDP (Million TShs) 2.8 2.3
Regional shares of GDP (Percentage) 4.7 100
Poverty
Percentage of population below the food poverty line 7.6 8
Percentage of population below the basic neeeds poverty line 24.7 26.4
Source: National Bureau of statistics reports compiled by author
Other characteristics of Arusha region are presented in Table 3.3. The access to financial
service in Arusha region measured by ownership of bank account is below the national average.
1In Tanzania, poverty is measured by using Household Budget Survey (HBS) data. The poor are defined as those
whose consumption is below the national basics needs poverty line, and the extreme poor are those who cannot afford
enough food to meet the minimum nutritional requirements of 2,200 kilocalories per adult per day. The national basic
needs poverty line for 2018 was TShs 49,320 per adult per month, and the food poverty line was TShs 33,748 per adult
per month.
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Overall, 10.1% of households in Arusha region have at least one person who operates a bank
account, which is below the national average of 12.3% (URT, 2019). This implies that access to
formal financial services in the region is limited.
Table 3.3: Comparison of Arusha and Tanzania in terms of socioeconomic characteristics
Arusha region Tanzania
Housing and Electricity
Percentage of households with a modern roof 80.5 84.1
Percentage of households with modern walls 54.7 78.8
Percentage of household with modern floors 51.1 50.1
Percentage of household with electricity 33 29
Education and Health
Primary school net enrolment ratio 80.1 76.6
Percentage of literate adults 80.3 77.9
Female life expectancy (years) 69.4 61.0
Male life expectancy years 65.9 53.9
Sex ratio (male/female) 94 95
Ownership of assets
Percentage of household owning a radio 64.3 61.4
Percentage of household owning a television 22.3 15.1
Percentage of household owning a bicycle 18.7 39.8
Percentage of household owning a motorcycle 5.3 4.9
Percentage of household owning a mobile phone 75.2 63.4
Percentage of household ownng land 60.9 71.2
Ownership of bank account
At least one household member has a bank account 10.1 12.3
No member with a bank account 89.9 87.7
Source: National Bureau of statistics reports compiled by author
3.3 Status of SACCOs in Arusha Region
SACCOs in the Arusha region are found in rural and urban areas. Community-based SACCOs
constitute a significant share of the SACCOs in the Arusha region. About 90% of the SACCOs in
Arusha region are community-based.
Between 2012 and 2018, the number of SACCOs and SACCO’s members in Arusha region
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grow by 6.8% and 2.8%, respectively. Financial activities also expanded. Member’s shares dou-
bled, savings amount and disbursed loans almost doubled between 2012 and 2018. (Table 3.4).
Because of that growth, in 2018 Arusha region ranked second in the number of SACCOs, the
amount of savings, and the amount of loan disbursed by SACCOs in Tanzania after the Dar es
Salaam region. It also ranked fourth in the amount of shares and deposits.
Despite that growth, some challenges remain. Arusha region is not an exception for the ex-
istence of a large number of inactive SACCOs. According to the TCDC report, as of December
2018, approximately 28 percent of the SACCOs in the Arusha region were not active, and 8 percent
could not be traced (Table 3.5). The reasons might be the same as in most SACCOs in Tanzania;
the high loan delinquency and default rates (Ndiege et al., 2016; Ishengoma, 2012). This is due to
the provision of government grant funds (Brown et al., 2015; Mwizarubi et al., 2016). Reliance on
external sources of funds can also be one of the reasons, as claimed by one of the credit officers in
the Arusha region during the interviews. This is due to the debt accumulation that resulted from
high interest rates charged by external sources such as commercial banks.
Table 3.4: Growth of SACCOs financial activities in Arusha region
2012 2018 Growth rate (%)
Shares (billion TShs) 2.3 4.7 109.1
Savings (billion TShs) 16.8 26.8 59.0
Deposits (billion TShs) 0.7 2.5 269.5
Loan disbursed (billion TShs) 88.0 162.6 84.8
Source: Author computation using data from Ministry of Agriculture (2019)
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Table 3.5: The status of SACCOs in Arusha region in comparison with other regions
Region Active SACCOs Inactive SACCOs Non-traceable SACCOs Total Shares (Bil. TShs) Savings (Bil. TShs) Deposits (Bil. TShs) Loan disbursed (Bil. TShs)
Arusha 250 109 32 391 4.74 26.77 2.46 162.61
Dar es Salaam 364 295 176 835 36.15 340.04 9.44 454.52
Dodoma 142 100 52 294 0.65 2.04 0.03 4.42
Geita 184 189 1 374 0.95 1.87 1.01 14.02
Iringa 159 100 0 259 1.83 8.82 1.49 21.98
Kagera 135 148 0 283 1.84 10.94 0.97 37.84
Katavi 13 21 4 38 0.12 1.12 0.05 16.18
Kigoma 141 116 0 257 0.30 2.96 0.09 20.91
Kilimanjaro 210 77 54 341 0.63 1.23 0.66 9.25
Lindi 31 17 9 57 0.33 2.29 0.35 3.98
Manyara 75 92 10 177 1.02 3.34 0.10 93.80
Mara 51 59 73 183 1.11 3.56 0.17 11.76
Mbeya 129 36 100 265 8.06 26.33 7.69 63.00
Morogoro 72 132 100 304 2.86 13.05 1.74 76.88
Mwanza 83 75 195 353 1.09 3.49 0.17 11.53
Njombe 84 48 13 145 7.90 25.80 7.54 61.74
Pwani 62 26 123 211 1.07 26.75 0.30 19.37
Rukwa 57 66 11 134 0.41 1.30 0.02 2.82
Ruvuma 63 47 16 126 1.13 7.56 1.10 20.99
Shinyanga 44 53 8 105 0.62 3.92 0.36 6.41
Simiyu 29 83 12 124 0.19 1.97 0.01 2.06
Singida 38 78 8 124 0.48 3.06 0.05 15.15
Songwe 45 34 2 81 0.31 1.66 0.16 5.20
Tabora 41 42 132 215 0.25 2.49 0.08 17.57
Tanga 168 73 53 294 3.74 12.77 0.46 53.74
Total 2670 2116 1184 5970 77.76 535.14 36.50 1207.73
Source: Reports from Tanzania Cooperative Development Commission, TCDC (2019).
3.4 Status of BRAC Tanzania in Arusha region
Arusha region is one of the regions in which BRAC Tanzania started its microfinance program in
Tanzania when it started in 2006. According to the BRAC Tanzania region division, it is one of
the thirteen regions. It is under the Kilimanjaro division office and it has a total of six area offices
and seventeen branch offices. The seventeen branches are divided in six area offices as follows:
Arusha East area office has four branches (Ungalimited, Sekei, Olerian, and Kimandolu), Arusha
West area office has four branches (Monduli, Ngaramtoni, Sakina, and Sombetini), Manyara area
office has two branches (Babati, and Katesh), Magugu area office has two branches (Magugu and
Karatu), Usa river area office has three branches (Tengeru, Usa river, and Mererani ) and Kondoa
area office has two branches (Kondoa and Galapo).
Branch characteristics such as number of groups, members, borrowers, and average loan sizes
differ due to branch location. Rural branches, for example, Babati, Katesh, Kondoa, Magugu, and
Karatu branches, have a larger number of members compares to urban branches (for example,
Kimandou, Sakina, Sekei, and Olerian). This happens because the branch operations area in rural
areas is big and branches are far from each other compared to urban areas where branches are
close to each other hence, small operation areas.
The other difference is brought by the branch age. The average loan sizes for the new branches
(Karatu and Merereni branches) are smaller compared to the averages for old branches such as
Tengeru, Usa river, Ungalimited, Olerian, and Sakina branches. This is because the loan sizes
increase with time. Old branches have old members; hence, the average loan sizes are bigger
compared to new branches (Table 3.6).
BRAC Tanzania has a system of ranking its regions monthly according to various perfor-
mance indicators. In August 2019, the Arusha region ranked the eighth out of thirteen regions.
The ranking is based on the score on the various indicators, including the number of borrowers,
outstanding loans, current overdue loans, portfolio at risk (PAR), repayment rates, and the number
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of borrowers per community organizers (COs). The highest score is thirteen, and the lowest is
one. The overall ranking is obtained after summing up all the indicators scores. The higher the
score, the better the performance. Arusha region score performance on the number of borrowers
and the amount of outstanding loans is high (11 and 10 scores, respectively). However, the per-
formance score on the other indicators, such as the current amount of overdue loans and PAR, is
lower in comparison to other regions (5 and 3 scores, respectively). Since both are indicators of
the repayment performance, it implies that the repayment performance is low in comparison to
other regions (Table 3.7).
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Table 3.6: BRAC Tanzania microfinance program in Arusha region (branch-level status)
Branch name Year
established
Number of
groups
Number of
members
Number of
borrowers
Amount of
outstanding
loans (Mil.
TShs)
Average loan
size (TShs)
Babati 2009 90 2,355 1,634 666.6 407,977
Galapo 2010 70 1,305 881 345.7 392,446
Katesh 2009 91 1,691 1,375 582.0 423,279
Kimandolu 2007 71 772 578 266.2 460,470
Kondoa 2009 78 1,644 1,031 436.1 423,033
Magugu 2009 88 2,431 1,846 857.8 464,667
Monduli 2010 45 581 424 215.3 507,804
Ngaramtoni 2009 45 1,137 789 351.6 445,652
Olerian 2006 62 892 646 320.5 496,125
Sakina 2007 58 887 612 328.4 536,600
Sekei 2006 50 792 614 283.8 462,222
Sombetini 2009 53 1,350 701 336.9 480,632
Tengeru 2006 61 1,271 942 535.1 568,053
Ungalimited 2006 91 1,059 813 402.1 494,644
Karatu 2016 78 2,236 1,717 599.1 348,943
Mererani 2018 45 829 738 236.8 320,824
Usa river 2006 78 1,142 935 480.5 513,938
Total 1154 22,374 16,276 7,244.7 445,115
Source: Compiled by author using BRAC Tanzania (2018) .
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Table 3.7: BRAC Tanzania microfinance program regional ranking (Part 1)
Name of the region Total CO Borrowers Score Outstanding loans
(Million TShs)
Score Current overdue loans
(Million TShs)
Score
Tanga 81 22,712 13 10,649 13 13.51 9
Mbeya 60 15,912 10 8,008 9 12.68 11
Njombe 40 10,853 6 4,847 6 2.92 13
Dodoma 51 13,986 8 8,515 11 20.35 6
Kagera 42 11,750 5 4,488 4 10.96 10
Mwanza 64 18,337 12 9,587 12 59.98 2
Morogoro 43 10,885 4 4,944 5 8.00 12
Arusha 70 15,976 11 8,241 10 27.07 5
Shinyanga 58 15,002 9 6,801 8 31.34 4
Kilimanjaro 56 12,239 7 6,457 7 15.5 8
Zanzibar 32 6,349 1 3,323 1 18.57 7
Dar es Salaam 1 34 6,717 2 4,117 2 42.07 3
Dar es Salaam 2 37 7,106 3 4,276 3 143.83 1
668 167,824 84,253 406.78
Source: Compiled by author using BRAC Tanzania (2018)
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Table 3.8: BRAC Tanzania microfinance program regional ranking (Part 2)
Name of the region PAR Score Repayment rate Score CO per borrowers Score Total score
Tanga 0.29 12 99.61 9 280 12 68
Mbeya 0.37 11 99.92 13 265 8 62
Njombe 0.21 13 99.88 12 271 9 59
Dodoma 0.48 10 99.59 8 274 10 53
Kagera 0.55 9 99.64 10 280 12 50
Mwanza 2.22 4 98.63 3 287 13 46
Morogoro 1.05 8 99.70 11 252 6 46
Arusha 2.50 3 99.46 6 228 5 40
Shinyanga 1.27 6 99.03 5 259 7 39
Kilimanjaro 1.55 5 99.58 7 219 4 38
Zanzibar 1.25 7 98.70 4 198 3 23
Dar es Salaam 1 7.07 1 98.25 2 197 2 12
Dar es Salaam 2 6.94 2 94.71 1 192 1 11
Source: Compiled by author using BRAC Tanzania (2018)
Chapter 4.
Outreach and Efficiency of Semi-Formal Microfinance Institutions in Tanzania
4.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to understand the financial services of the selected SACCOs and of BRAC
Tanzania. It also aims to analyzes the performance of the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania
focusing on outreach, as well as efficiency in terms of operating costs. Reaching the poor and
providing them with credit may be very costly. Poor clients may live in rural areas, which makes
it more costly to supply them with financial services due to higher transaction costs. Moreover, in
many cases, they do not have collateral to pledge when obtaining a loan, which may increase the
risks, and therefore the costs for the MFIs. Servicing poor clients may also be more costly because
information about their repayment capacity is generally more opaque than for richer clients. This
makes the process of screening and monitoring of clients more expensive.
Although MFIs have developed methods to reduce these costs (e.g., by offering group loans,
making borrowers jointly responsible for the repayment of individual loans), lending to the poor
on average is still more expensive and riskier than offering loans to wealthier clients who have a
regular income. Thus, there may be a trade-off between efficiency and outreach, implying that the
shifting focus toward increasing efficiency may reduce the scope for the traditional aim of many
MFIs, which is lending to the poor.
4.2 Selection of SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania and their Financial Services
4.2.1 Sample selection
Three representative SACCOs were selected from the roster of SACCOs operating in the Arusha
region. While selecting, the following criteria were used: (i)community-based, 1 ; (ii) have a long-
1Community-based SACCOs are more diverse than employee-based ones. A variety of members and loan types are
observed.
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standing operating experience (five years or more)2, and (iii)hold a large amount of outstanding
loans compared to other SACCOs in the region3. From the above criteria, three SACCOs were se-
lected—Nanenane Women, Krokoni, and Umatama. For BRAC Tanzania, Arusha regional head-
quarters was selected due to the availability of reliable information. No branch interviews were
conducted, as the BRAC Tanzania policy is uniformly implemented across the country.
4.2.2 Profile of the selected SACCOs
(i) Nanenane Women
Nanenane Women started as a group of twenty members who help each other on different occa-
sions. Later the group members decided to start a SACCO that was registered in June 2004. The
aims are to raise and strengthening members’ economic and social status, encourage member’s
investment and regular savings, accepting member’s shares and savings, and offering low-interest
rate loans to members. For a person to become a member, she must meet the eligibility criteria.
Some of the criteria include; a resident of the Arusha region, female, willing to follow all the rules
of the SACCOs, pay a membership fee and buy a minimum number of shares. The membership
fee is TShs 20,000 and a minimum of 10 shares, which value TShs 100,000. Additional to the
membership fees and shares, to obtain a loan member must save first. Savings act as collateral for
the loan.
(ii) Krokoni
Krokoni SACCO was registered in May 2008 after the decision from Krokoni market retailers. The
aims of starting a SACCO were to encourage members to have a habit of investing and savings
regularly, offer loans to members, and educate members on financial matters. Some of the criteria
to be a member include; having a booth at Krokoni market, approved by other members, pay a
2In analyzing performance, time was considered an important factor. Hence, SACCOs with an operations history of
five years and above were considered.
3The selection criterion on the amount of the outstanding loans was based on 2014 data.
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membership fee, and buy membership shares. The membership fee is TShs 2,000 and a minimum
of 10 shares, which value TShs 5,000 each.
(iii) Umatama
Umatama SACCO was found and registered in February 2006. Umatama SACCO started as a
social group of the people from Rukwa region living in the Arusha region. Later 58 members
decide to start SACCOs to help each other financially. The aims are to accept members’ savings
and offer loans with the minimum requirements to its members. Member must be a resident of
the Arusha region and known by two old members. The membership fee is TShs 40,000 and a
minimum of 3 shares, which value TShs 2,000 each.
4.2.3 Financial services of the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania
The main financial service provided by the selected SACCOs, as well as BRAC Tanzania, is loan
provision, as presented in Table 4.1. The SACCOs target only their members for loans, whereas
BRAC Tanzania offers loans to all in the community. The members of the selected SACCOs are
affiliated by occupation. For example, the members of Nanenane Women and Umatama are mostly
salaried earners and business owners, while Krokoni members are clothing retailers. The types of
loans provided include business, emergency, general purpose, microfinance,4 and small enterprise
loans. General purpose loans offered by Krokoni and Umatama are intended for various uses, such
as consumption, investment, and emergencies. BRAC Tanzania’s microfinance loans are specially
designed for poor women, assisting them in undertaking income-generating activities. The small
enterprise loans target small and medium business owners, farmers, and small traders. Both men
and women are eligible to apply. All the loans provided by these institutions are individual loans,
with the exception of BRAC Tanzania’s microfinance loans, which are offered to groups.
The minimum loan amounts appear to be almost the same for the selected SACCOs and BRAC
4The term microfinance, as used in this context, refers to a type of loan offered by MFI. Further descriptions are
found in Table 4.1.
47
Tanzania, with the exception of BRAC Tanzania’s small enterprise loans. The maximum amount
of the loan varies among the selected SACCOs, according to the client type. The maximum loan
amount offered by Umatama is eight times that offered by Krokoni. These loans are either short-
term (less than one year) or mid-term (more than one year but less than two) loans. Repayment is
on a monthly basis, with the exception of BRAC Tanzania’s microfinance loans, which are repaid
on a weekly basis with a minimum repayment requirement of 20 weeks.
In addition to the provision of loans, the selected SACCOs also intermediate savings from
members. This is in contrast to BRAC Tanzania, which is barred from intermediating savings due
to country’s legal restrictions.5 There are two types of savings provided by the selected SACCOs:
compulsory and voluntary. The former is the type of savings that members are required to pay on
a regular basis, as per SACCOs regulations, while the latter allows members to deposit as much
money as they want.
Table 4.1: Characteristics of loans provided by the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania
Nanenane Women Krokoni Umatama BRAC Tanzania
Types of loans Business and
emergency
General
purpose
General
purpose
MFL SEL
Target group Members Members Members Women Men and
Women
Minimum amount (TShs) 100,000 100,000 NA 200,000 1.2 million
Maximum amount (TShs) 15 million 5 million 40 million 3 million 30 million
Annual interest rate 15% 18% 24% 25% 25%
Maximum loan duration 1 year 1 year 1.5 year 10 months 1 year
Source: Authors, 2017.
Notes:
1. USD 1 is about TShs 2,120 (as of June 2015).
2. MFL stands for microfinance loan while SEL stands for small enterprise loan.
5In most countries, unregulated financial institutions are not permitted to take deposits from the public. Thus,
if an institution wants to offer saving facilities, some degree of formalization and prudential regulation is inevitable
(Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010).
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4.3 Outreach and Efficiency of the Selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania
4.3.1 Outreach of the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) focus on providing credit to the poor who have no access to
commercial banks in order to reduce poverty and to help the poor with setting up their own income
generating businesses. In the literature, this focus is generally described as outreach. According
to Yaron (1991), outreach is the measure that assesses the extent to which an MFI has succeeded
in reaching its target clients and the degree to which the MFI has met the demand of clients for
financial services. Different studies use different measures for measuring the outreach, depending
on the data available. According to Lafourcade et al. (2005), outreach can be measured in terms
of breadth — number of clients served and volume of services (i.e., total savings on deposit and
total outstanding portfolio) — or depth — the socioeconomic level of clients that MFIs reach.6
According to Ndiege et al. (2013), outreach in SACCOs is measured by increase in number of
active members along with financial services.7
This study analyzes the outreach in terms of the expansion of credit. The number of members,
outstanding loan amount, and average loan size are used as proxies for outreach. The changes
in the growth and expansion of lending activities of the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania
are shown in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, respectively. The selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania
show significant growth in the number of members, outstanding loan amounts, and average loan
size over the reference period, although they exhibit different rates of growth. This growth is an
indicator of outreach success. The growth in the amount of outstanding loans for the selected
SACCOs was higher than that of BRAC Tanzania, as the selected SACCOs were more focused on
servicing businesses. In the case of two of the selected SACCOs (Nanenane Women and Krokoni),
the rate of growth of the average loan size was higher than that of the members. The increase in
6Depth outreach is usually measured by average loan size, though this proxy is facing critics still no other reliable
mean of measurement (Nyamsogoro, 2010).
7Dulamragchaa and Izumida (2011) used number of borrowers, amount of outstanding loans, and average loan size
as the measure of the expansion of credit and level of the outreach of Khan Bank and Xac Bank in Mongolia.
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the average loan size was associated with the expansion in members’ economic activities, as well
as an increase in deposits. In most cases, the SACCOs depend on deposits from their members
to increase their capital. This also reflects their ability to provide loans. However, the Umatama
SACCO was the exception, as it had always provided large loans from its inception.
Table 4.2: The growth lending activities of the selected SACCOs
Baseline Endline Growth
times
Annual
growth
rates (%)
Real
growth
rates (%)
Nanenane Women
Baseline/ endline 2005 2013
Number of members 50 221 4.4 20.4
Amount of loans (million TShs) 5.5 301 54.75 64.9 55.2
Average loan size (‘000 TShs) 109.6 1362.2 12.4 36.9 27.2
Inflation index 100 212.6 2.1 9.7
Krokoni
Baseline/ endline 2008 2013
Number of members 81 108 1.3 5.4
Amount of loans (million TShs) 3.4 90.3 26.6 92.7 81.8
Average loan size (‘000 TShs) 41.7 836.1 20.1 82.1 70.9
Inflation index 100 167.7 1.7 11.2
Umatama
Baseline/endline year 2009 2014
Number of members 72 118 1.6 9.8
Amount of loans (million TShs) 38.8 153.2 3.9 31.6 21.7
Average loan size (‘000 TShs) 538.7 1298.5 2.4 19.2 9.3
Inflation index 100 159 1.6 9.9
Source: Authors, 2017 (Based on SACCOs annual reports).
Notes:
1. Baseline refers to the year in which the selected SACCOs started operation, and endline refers to the last year of
the data used in the analysis.
2. Due to variations in baseline across SACCOs, the inflation index was computed on the baseline year of the three
selected SACCOs.
3. In calculating changes in amount of loans and average loan size, the real growth rate was applied by using the
inflation rate from the consumer price index (CPI).
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Table 4.3: The growth of lending activities of BRAC Tanzania
Baseline Endline Growth
times
Annual
growth
rates (%)
Real
growth
rates (%)
Baseline/ endline 2008 2014
Number of members 57,343 101,068 1.8 10.3
Amount of loans(million TShs) 7,250 31,122 4.3 27.5 16.7
Average loan size (‘000 TShs) 126 308 2.4 16.1 5.3
Inflation index 100 185 1.9 10.8
Source: Authors, 2017 (Based on BRAC Tanzania annual reports).
Notes:
1. Baseline and endline respectively refers to the first and last year of the data used in the analysis.
2. In calculating changes in amount of loans and average loan size, the real growth rate was applied by
using the inflation rate from the consumer price index (CPI).
4.3.2 The efficiency of the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania
This section examines the efficiency of the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania. Efficiency is a
measure of how well an MFI controls its costs.8 Most studies on the measurement of the efficiency
of MFIs focus on cost efficiency (Hermes et al., 2011). The main reason is that, according to many
observers, microfinance’s mission should be to reduce poverty. Thus, given the available financial
resources, MFIs should aim at maximizing their contribution to this goal. Reducing the costs of
providing services may maximize their contribution to poverty reduction.
Cost efficiency, that is, the extent to which MFIs are efficient in using resources and turning
them into services, is closely linked to attaining their goal of making a long-term contribution to
helping the poor. Several studies have assessed the efficiency of MFIs using different approaches.
Qayyum and Ahmed (2006) measure the efficiency of nineteen MFIs in three South Asian coun-
tries for which they use data envelopment analysis (DEA). Desrochers and Lamberte (2003) mea-
sure efficiency for a sample of 50 cooperative rural banks, using different methodologies, such
as stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and the distribution free approach. They focus on aspects of
corporate governance and show that more efficient rural banks are the ones that are better able to
8Costs here refer to operating costs, such as employees’ salaries, rents, travel and building costs; it excludes the cost
of funds, which is the interest paid on deposits.
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control agency costs.
Gutierrez-Nieto et al. (2007), who also use DEA, investigate the efficiency of 30 Latin Ameri-
can MFIs and show that differences in efficiency levels are associated with the location of the MFIs
(i.e., in which country they are) as well as with their institutional type. Segun and Anjugam (2013)
used a panel dataset of 70 MFIs from 25 countries in SSA to analyze the efficiency of MFIs. Their
results show that MFIs are inefficient in meeting the goal of either providing microfinance-related
services to their clients or intermediating funds between borrowers and depositors. Abdulai and
Tewari (2016), who investigated the cost efficiency of MFIs operating in 10 SSA countries between
2003 and 2013, obtained similar results. They found that MFIs are cost inefficient in their inter-
mediation role. Other studies have also examined the underlying determinants of such efficiency.
For example, Paxton (2007) measured the efficiency of popular Mexican savings and credit insti-
tutions, concluding that differences in efficiency are associated with differences in technology,9
average loan size, rural outreach, and the age of the lending institution.
Traditionally, MFI efficiency is normally studied by means of financial ratios (Brownlow,
2007). This study analyzes efficiency by using operating expenses over the average outstanding
loan ratio.10 Previous studies that use a similar measure to analyze the efficiency include Gonzalez
(2007) and Kneiding et al. (2009). The main reason for this choice is the link between expenses
and interest rates. An increase in the MFI’s expenses will lead to a rise in interest rates, which
will then increase the borrower’s repayment burdens. However, if the MFI is able to reduce its
expenses, it can also reduce its lending rate or increase its surplus, which adds to its profit (Figure
4.1). Given the link between expenses, interest rates, and profits, the analysis includes two other
financial ratios: interest revenue and the surplus to outstanding loans ratio.
9Investment in technology refers to the use of computers in institutional and managerial activities; this was measured
by Paxton (2007) as the number of computers per employee.
10Other metrics to measure efficiency are the cost per borrower, cost per loan, number of borrowers, number of savers
per employee, and the difference between the lending rate and the deposit rate (spread).
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Suppose higher expenses 
(cost of operations) have 
resulted to low surplus 
(profit).
Action
MFIs may start to charge 
higher interest rate.
Effect
1. Increases repayment burden on the 
borrowers.
2. For MFIs, it results to deviation from 
their fundamental mission, which is 
serving the poor.
Suppose low expenses 
(cost of operations) have 
resulted to higher surplus 
(profit).
Action
MFIs may start to charge 
lower interest rate.
Effect
1. Reduces repayment burden on the 
borrowers.
2. Helps MFIs to fulfill their 
fundamental mission, which is 
serving the poor.
Case A: 
Case B: 
Figure 4.1: Depiction of theory regarding efficiency of MFIs
Source: Author, 2017
4.3.3 Results of the descriptive analysis of efficiency of the selected SACCOs and BRAC
Tanzania
In the descriptive analysis, a trend of the efficiency ratios can be observed. This trend shows
whether or not there is an efficiency gain. As presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5, the results from
the indicators related to average interest rates, expenses, and surplus show an unclear trend for
the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania. However, the results do show notable differences
between the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania (Figure 4.2). First, the average interest rate
charged by the selected SACCOs, expressed as the ratio of interest revenue to outstanding loans,
was considerably lower than that charged by BRAC Tanzania. The annual lending interest rates of
Nanenane Women and Krokoni averaged 11 23.4% and 21.8%, respectively, while the interest rate
charged by BRAC Tanzania averaged 53.1%.
Second, the selected SACCOs’ cost indicators were lower than those of BRAC Tanzania.
The ratios of expenses, including interest payments, to outstanding loans for Nanenane Women
and Krokoni were 11.7% and 6.5%, respectively; the ratio for BRAC Tanzania was 33.5% (after
excluding the cost of funds). The observed gap is caused by the difference in the loan amounts
offered by the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania. BRAC Tanzania, on average, offers loans
11The averages is computed as three years average (2011, 2012 and 2013).
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of financial ratios
Source: Author, 2017
of a size smaller than those offered by the selected SACCOs. Making very small-sized loans
involves high transaction costs per loan in terms of screening, monitoring, and administration
costs. Several authors have claimed that the unit transaction cost for small loans to the poor is high
when compared to the unit transaction cost of larger loans (Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Conning,
1999; Paxton and Cuevas, 2002; Lapenu and Zeller, 2002).
With respect to the surplus ratio, there are no significant differences between the selected
SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania. The average ratios for Nanenane Women, Krokoni, and BRAC
Tanzania are 15.6%, 17.5%, and 13.6%, respectively. During 2008 and 2009, BRAC Tanzania
reported a negative surplus, but after 2009, a positive surplus was observed. This was probably
due to the increase in its lending rate from 2010 onwards. Looking at the costs for the selected
SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania, there was no clear trend, which may suggest that there was no
efficiency gain over the reference period.
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Table 4.4: Efficiency of the selected SACCOs (unit: %)
Indicators (ratios) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Nanenane Women
Interest revenue to outstanding loan 15 19.9 25.8 25.7 26.2 23.3 23.9 23
Other revenue to outstanding loan 1.9 2.3 6.1 6.7 4.6 4.6 3.2 3.9
Total revenue to outstanding loan 16.9 22.2 31.9 32.4 30.8 27.9 27.1 26.9
Expense to outstanding loan 12.1 8.2 9.5 7.1 8.8 10.9 9.8 14.4
Surplus to outstanding loan 4.8 14 22.4 25.3 22 17 17.3 12.5
Krokoni
Interest revenue to outstanding loan 30.9 28.6 25.2 20.3 19.9
Other revenue to outstanding loan 5.7 7.5 3.8 2 1.1
Total revenue to outstanding loan 36.6 36.1 29 22.3 21
Expense to outstanding loan 14.3 13.5 5.1 8.7 5.8
Surplus to outstanding loan 22.3 22.6 23.9 13.6 15.2
Source: Authors, 2017 (Using SACCOs annual reports)
Notes:
1. The expenses include interest paid to the depositors and other costs were not separated in the
selected SACCOs financial statements. Also, due to data limitations analysis of Umatama
SACCOs could not be done.
2. Other revenue mainly comes from membership fees.
Table 4.5: Efficiency of BRAC Tanzania (unit:%)
Indicators (ratios) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Interest revenue to outstanding loan 43.1 45.9 52.7 50.3 55.6 53.4
Other revenue to outstanding loan 5.8 41.5 12.2 3.9 0.3 1.2
Total revenue to outstanding loan 48.9 87.4 64.9 54.2 55.9 54.6
Interest expense to outstanding loan 10.6 12.7 14.8 8.7 7 7.5
Other expense to outstanding loan 47.7 76.5 49.3 32 30.9 37.7
Total expense to outstanding loan 58.3 89.2 64.1 40.7 37.9 45.2
Surplus to outstanding loan -9.4 -1.8 0.8 13.5 18 9.4
Source: Authors, 2017 (Using BRAC Tanzania’s annual reports)
Notes:
1. The expense for BRAC Tanzania is separated into interest expenses and other expenses.
2. Interest expenses is the expenses used to fund the term loans.
3. The other expenses include employees’ salaries, rents, traveling costs, and building costs; it
excludes the cost of funds, which is the interest paid on deposits.
4. Other revenue mainly comes from membership fees.
4.3.4 Empirical analysis on efficiency of the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania
In assessing the efficiency of the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania, the descriptive results
show that efficiency did not improve over time. To confirm this, a regression analysis was con-
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ducted. Here, cost per loan ratio was introduced as the main indicator to measure efficiency. It
shows that the cost of providing loans depends on the number of loans made. This ratio is most
useful for long term calculations and comparisons to determine if the costs are decreasing or in-
creasing.
The first hypothesis was that time (X3) plays a significant role in the efficiency of semi-formal
MFIs in Tanzania. The basis of the hypothesis is derived from the results of Caudill et al. (2009),
who indicate that the operating costs of MFIs become lower over time. The second hypothesis
was that the average loan size (X1) and the loan to asset ratio (X2) have a negative relationship
with cost per loan (Y ). The loan to asset ratio measures the share of the MFI’s assets allocated
to its lending activities. Assuming economies of scale, economies of full capital utilization, and
efficiency gain over time, negative signs were expected for all the parameters, that is, X1, X2, and
X3. The results of the analysis are shown in Table 4.6. As expected, the cost per loan and loan
size were negatively related and statistically significant. Furthermore, the cost per loan and loan
to asset ratio were negatively related and statistically significant, which was also as expected. This
implies that if capital is not fully utilized, the cost increases. Cost per loan and time were positively
related but not statistically significant. This was contrary to the hypothesis and implies that time
was not a significant factor contributing to efficiency in the analysis period.
4.3.5 Conclusion
This chapter examined outreach and efficiency performance of semi-formal MFIs in Tanzania,
using the cases of the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania as representative institutions. Several
notable differences between BRAC Tanzania and the selected SACCOs were found:(i) BRAC
Tanzania only offers credit services as NGO-MFIs in Tanzania are not allowed to accept savings,
while the selected SACCOs offer both credit and saving services; (ii) BRAC Tanzania uses a group
lending method, while the selected SACCOs lend directly to individuals; (iii) BRAC Tanzania
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Table 4.6: Efficiency gain over time (Cross-Section Pooled Regression)
Dependent variable (Y) is Cost per Loan
Independent variables Coefficients Standard Error t statistics p-value
Intercept 103.28 18.74 5.51 5.984×10−5***
Average loan size (X1) −3.404×10−5 1.70×10−5 -1.96 0.069*
Loan to asset ratio (X2) -0.935 0.24 -3.95 0.001***
Time (X3) 1.279 1.76 0.73 0.479
Number of observations 19
Adjusted R-square 0.62
Regression equation Y = 103.28−3.4×10−5X1−0.935X2 +1.279X3
(5.511) (−1.96) (−3.95) (0.726)
Source: Authors’ estimations, 2017
Notes:
1. *** denotes significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%.
2. In a regression equation, the numbers enclosed in parentheses are t statistics values.
offers smaller loan sizes than those offered by the selected SACCOs; and (iv) the interest rate
charged by BRAC Tanzania is considerably higher than that charged by the selected SACCOs; (v)
BRAC Tanzania has higher operating costs than that of the selected SACCOs.
Regarding the financial performance, the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania were suc-
cessful in improving outreach through growth and expansion of their lending activities. The de-
scriptive and regression results show that there was no efficiency gain, implying that representative
semi-formal microfinance institutions in Tanzania should adopt innovative methods to reduce the
costs.
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Chapter 5.
Repayment Performance in Group Lending: The Case of BRAC Tanzania
5.1 Introduction
The discovery of group lending opened up possibilities for microfinance. Today, group lending is
just one element that makes microfinance different from conventional banking (Armendáriz and
Morduch, 2010). Over the past three decades, the group lending model has been widely replicated
and adopted in many countries. It has been replicated in Bolivia, Chile, China, Ethiopia, Honduras,
India, Malaysia, Mali, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, the United States, and
Vietnam (Morduch, 1999). Generally, group lending refers to arrangements made by individuals
without collateral, who get together and form groups to obtain loans from the lender (Armendáriz
and Morduch, 2010). It is cited as an innovation to overcome imperfect information in financial
markets by addressing four main problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, monitoring, and
enforcement (Besley and Coate, 1995; Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999).
5.2 Group Lending Model: Literature Review
5.2.1 The varieties and origins of group
There are many different types of microfinance group systems, which make different levels of
demands on their members. The best-known method is that pioneered by the Grameen Bank
in Bangladesh. Other institutions instead base their method on the “solidarity group” approach
developed by Bolivia’s BancoSol or the “village bank” approach operated by microlenders in
seventy countries throughout Africa, Latin America, and Asia. The unique feature of the classic
Grameen Bank model is that the loans are made individually to group members. However, all
group members face the consequences if any member runs into serious repayment difficulties.
In the original Grameen Bank case, the groups are made up of five people. In the BancoSol
case, groups can be as small as three people, and in the village banking system, groups can range
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from ten to about thirty women. The fundamental idea of “group responsibility” (sometimes called
“joint liability”) coupled with regular group meetings is common across approaches. When the
Grameen Bank first got started as an experiment bank in the village of Jobra, near Chittagong
University, the first loans were made to individuals without a group responsibility clause. Instead,
the economies of scale motivated the first use of groups (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010).
At first, the groups were seen just as sources of solidarity, offering mutual assistance in times
of need. For example, if a member of a group fails to attend a meeting, the group leader repays
on her behalf. The original premise was that perhaps someone might experience a delay in getting
a loan if there were a problem within their group, but there would not be further sanctions. Over
time, formal sanctions become more common. In principle, if serious repayment problems emerge,
all group members will be cut off from future borrowing. The original idea was not that group
members would be forced to repay for others, rather it was that they would lose the privilege of
borrowing (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010).
In major departures, Grameen Bank has forsworn lending with joint liability, and BancoSol
does very little of it now. The shift to individual liability is not merely the Grameen Bank and
a few other large, well-known lenders, but many lenders around the world are following the lead
of the large, well-known lenders (Giné and Karlan, 2009). De Quidt et al. (2018) use MFI-level
panel data and show there has been a trend away from joint liability in recent years. It is important
to mention that in 2016, BRAC Tanzania followed the lead of many microlenders, such as Ban-
coSol and Grameen Bank, by converting to individual liability1. However, interestingly, Grameen
and other MFIs who have made this shift have chosen to retain the regular group meetings that
traditionally went hand-in-hand with joint liability lending.
The weekly group meetings have some advantages for lenders and customers. For lenders,
group meetings reduce the transaction costs of providing many small loans by concentrating clien-
1According to interviews with BRAC Tanzania officials, the reason for this change is to avoid the dropout of good
clients.
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tele in groups rather than dealing with individual borrowers at different times. For customers,
group meetings offer convenience as a local ROSCA or money lender. For example, in the case
of Grameen Bank, the bank goes to the villagers, and in case of any problems (a missing doc-
ument, few takas short) can be resolved on the spot (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). Group
meetings also facilitate education and training useful for clients with little experience to improve
the financial performance of their businesses (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2000).
5.2.2 Advantages and disadvantages of groups
Transacting through groups has some advantages and limitations. In particular, where the joint
liability clause is used in contracts, it can mitigate the moral hazard, adverse selection, and en-
forcement problems that crippled previous attempts at lending to the poor. From the lenders’
perspective, joint liability lending enables a transfer of default risks from the institution to the bor-
rower. Groups are also useful resource through which staff can directly elicit information about
errant borrowers and create pressure (Dichter and Harper, 2007).
For the group members, group lending creates an alternative to conventional loan collateral
requirements (which poor people can rarely fulfil). They get financial services they would not
otherwise have got, or at least that would not be available at relatively low-interest rates. Empow-
erment is also argued as one of the important social achievements of microfinance groups. This is
particularly important for women, given their disadvantaged social and economic position in many
places. Women say that groups give them a legitimate reason to be allowed to go out of their own
homes. Once their routine absence from home has been accepted, they can also access services
such as health care or literacy classes more easily (Dichter and Harper, 2007).
On the other side, group lending faces several criticisms and limitations. Firstly, group lending
can create pressure that works against the poorest and most vulnerable members of the community.
In attempting to keep repayment rates up, loan officers may put sharp pressure on borrowers
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to repay, even when the borrowers faced difficulties beyond their control. Montgomery (1996)
mentioned examples of ‘forced’ acquisition of household utensils, small livestock, or other assets
of defaulting members in several of the BRAC VOs. The criticism is that punishments are too
harsh.
Secondly, as groups mature, clients typically diverge in their demand for credit. Heterogeneity
in loan sizes can result in tension within the group as clients with smaller loans are reluctant to
serve as a guarantor for those with larger loans (Gine and Karlan, 2008). Excessive tension among
members is not only responsible for voluntary dropouts but can also harm social capital among
members, which is particularly important for the existence of safety nets (Gine and Karlan, 2006).
Thirdly, groups with joint liability contracts cause serious free-riding problems, inducing strategic
default and lowering repayment rates (Che, 2002; Kono, 2006; Fischer, 2013; Kono, 2013). Besley
and Coate (1995) argue that the whole group may default, even when some members would have
repaid under individual liability. This happens when the number of defaulting clients in the group
is so large that the remaining members cannot afford the repayment of defaulters, along with their
repayment. In this situation, borrowers that could repay their loans have little incentive to do so
because access to future loans will be denied. As a result, they will strategically decide to default.
Lastly, another important concern is the costs that are associated with group lending. Attend-
ing group meetings and monitoring group members can be costly, especially where houses are
not close together. In two of the three Chinese programs, 8 percent of clients had to walk more
than an hour to get to the meetings. Overall, attending meetings and travel time took just over
one hundred minutes on average (Park and Ren, 2001). Monitoring is also not costless, even for
individuals living in close proximity (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010).
Despite the challenges and criticisms, groups have served a crucial purpose in the functioning
of microfinance and have been a subject of extended academic debate. Results from different parts
of the world reveal different results. In Tanzania, group lending has been little studied. For that
61
reason, this study aims to add to the existing literature by using the case of BRAC Tanzania, one
of the largest group lending programs in the country. Specifically, this study aims to understand
the characteristics of BRAC Tanzania group lending programs, group formation, and importantly
to assess the repayment performance of groups.
In order to achieve the mentioned objectives, primary data were obtained through interviews
with key informants of BRAC Tanzania and questionnaires were administered to 177 members of
ten randomly selected groups from the Tengeru branch, one of the BRAC Tanzania branches in
the Arusha region (Description of the sample is found in Table 8.1 in the Appendix).
5.3 BRAC Tanzania Group Lending Programs
At the time of the survey in 2018, five group lending programs were operating in BRAC Tanzania:
Microfinance (MF), Empowerment and Livelihood for Adolescents (ELA), Adolescents Develop-
ment Program (ADP), Agrifinance, and Pembejeo2. Most programs target women in rural areas
and have common features regarding the lack of need for collateral, interest rate setting, frequency
of repayments, and the length of the loan. The three programs, namely, MF, ELA, and ADP, target
women from two age groups. MF program targets women aged 18–65 while ELA and ADP target
younger women aged 18–25. The remaining two programs target farmers. Agrifinance targets
maize and poultry farmers, and Pembejeo targets maize farmers. Table 5.1 shows the characteris-
tics of these group lending programs.
This study focuses on BRAC Tanzania’s MF program, the most important and oldest among
the organization’s programs. As of August 2019, the MF program was operating in 26 regions
across the country under Dar es Salaam head office with over 1000 staff, and approximately 95%
of them are female staff. It had over 200,000 members through the network of 151 branches and
2Pembejeo is a Swahili word which means agriculture inputs. This is a pilot program that is planned to be imple-
mented after it is successful.
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Table 5.1: Characteristics of BRAC Tanzania group lending programs
MF ELA ADP Agrifinance Pembejeo
Year started 2006 2012 2012 2014 2016
Collateral needed (yes/no) no no no no no
Target clients women women women farmers farmers
Repayment schedule weekly weekly weekly monthly monthly
Number of branches 138 8 22 43 2
Total number of members 193,648 2,646 6,590 23,016 160
Rural Borrowers 130,207 1,190 4,193 15,944 113
Urban Borrowers 20,679 764 624 2,982 0
Total number of borrowers 150,886 1,954 4,817 18,926 113
Minimum loan size (TShs) 250,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
Maximum loan size (TShs) 5,000,000 2,500,000 2,500,000 2,500,000 2,500,000
Source: Field survey, 2018.
Notes.
1. USD 1 was equivalent to TShs 2240 at the time of the survey.
2. All the data on the number of branches, members, and borrowers are as of January 2018.
11,889 groups (Table 5.2). Table 8.2 in the appendix shows the BRAC Tanzania expansion in the
Arusha region.
Table 5.2: Expansion of BRAC Tanzania’s microfinance program in Tanzania
Year Number of regions Number of branches Number of groups Number of members
2006 2 10 N.A. N.A.
2007 7 41 630 17,000
2008 14 68 3,000 80,000
2009 18 104 6,376 111,500
2010 18 112 7,748 144,294
2011 18 112 7,476 140,209
2012 18 112 7,619 126,851
2013 18 112 7,130 126,050
2014 18 120 7,557 139,000
2015 18 120 8,121 156,402
2016 21 127 8,982 168,345
2017 25 138 10,341 193,455
2018 25 146 11,321 214,046
2019 26 151 11,889 221,331
Source: BRAC Tanzania reports compiled by author, 2019.
Notes:
1. N.A. means data not available.
2. Data for the number of groups and members in the year 2007 is as of May.
3. Data for 2019 is as of August 2019.
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The contents of MF program is very similar microloan program also known as Dabi of BRAC
in Bangladesh. For example, both programs target rural women and provide small loans (under
USD 120). They have weekly meetings, and weekly payments are made in groups. A significant
difference between the two lending programs is that BRAC Bangladesh offers saving services,
unlike BRAC Tanzania. This is because NGO MFIs in Tanzania are not allowed to accept saving
deposits (See Table 8.3 in the appendix for comparison of BRAC Bangladesh and Tanzania).
5.3.1 Group formation and peer selection
Groups are formed after the research is conducted by community organizers in the targeted area.
The research aims to identify eligible community members. Interested individuals are instructed
to form groups according to geographical location (i.e., neighbors or people who live in the same
community). The eligibility criteria are as follows: (i) the applicant must be female, (ii) in rural
areas, the applicant has to remain a permanent resident whereas, in urban areas, she must have had
residency in the area for at least three years, (iii) the applicant should run small business or trade,
(iv)the applicant should live within the branch operating area, (v) all applicants of the same group
should share a similar socio-economic background and know each other well, and willing to be
abide by BRAC Tanzania’s principles, such as attendance of weekly meetings, on-time repayment,
and admission fees payment.
After the decision of the formation of the group, the declaration is made at the branch office.
After group declaration, the admitted members must pay the admission fee of TShs 1500 (less
than USD 1) 3. After becoming a member, a passbook is given where loan amount, interest rate,
and the repayments are being noted. The first passbook will be given for free, and for subsequent
passbooks, the member has to pay TShs 500.
Groups start with 15–30 members when they are formed.4 However, some grow in size when
3Every year members must renew membership with a fee of TShs 1000.
4BRAC Tanzania officially stipulates the group range of 15 to 30 members however; this appears to be relaxed in
the field.
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new members are admitted whereas others shrink due to dropouts. For example, the minimum and
maximum for the surveyed groups were 8 and 38 members, respectively. Based on observations
during the survey, there were several groups with over 40 members. Most members of the surveyed
groups were absent during the initial group formation. The current members joined after the
formation of the group, and most of the initial members left the program.
New members can join the group through a recommendation or introduction from a current
member. The most important criterion for selecting new members is simply whether current mem-
bers know the person well. If a woman lives in the same place, works in the same place, conducts
the same business, or has a close relationship with current members, then there probably is no
obstacle to her joining the group. Of course, there are some people wanting to join the group that
gets rejected for various reasons such as they were not well-known by other members, did not
conduct any business that could guarantee repayment, or had a record of not paying debts in the
village.
5.3.2 Characteristics of the group members and loans based on field survey
This section presents the field survey results of 177 members of the ten randomly selected groups
of Tengeru branch, one of BRAC Tanzania branches in Arusha region. According to the survey
results, the member’s average age was 40 years old and had completed primary education. Mem-
bers reported an average household size of four, with two working household members. Busi-
ness (68.9%) and agriculture (13.5%) were the main occupations. The businesses conducted by
most members involved selling banana (plantain), fruits, and vegetables. Half of the respondents
(50.8%) had multiple occupations (Table 5.3 and Table 5.4).
The process of obtaining BRAC Tanzania’s loan is devolved to peer approval. The new mem-
bers must wait for two weeks, which is regarded as orientation time before the loan application.
During the loan application, the member has to fill the form. After the application form is com-
65
Table 5.3: Socioeconomic characteristics of the group members (Part 1)
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Age 40.53 9.94 22 65
Member years of education 7.75 1.83 0 13
Household size 4.49 1.44 1 9
Working household members 2.22 0.81 1 6
Source: Field survey, 2018
Table 5.4: Socioeconomic characteristics of the group members (Part 2)
Frequency Percentage
Marital Status (n=177)
Single 7 4
Married 149 84.2
Widowed 14 7.9
Divorced/Separated 7 4
Main Occupations (n=177)
Business 122 68.9
Crop production only 8 4.5
Livestock keeping only 8 4.5
Crop production and livestock keeping 24 13.5
Employed 4 2.3
Others 11 6.2
Other occupations (n=90)
Business 34 37.8
Crop production only 17 18.9
Livestock keeping only 5 5.6
Crop production and livestock keeping 32 35.6
Others 2 2.2
Source: Field survey, 2018
pleted, then the approval and disbursement follows. BRAC Tanzania’s staff visit the proposed
borrower’s house and business to confirm the ability to repay and confirm the loan amount is
reasonable.
The maximum loan amount obtained by the members of the surveyed groups was USD 982,
with the average loan amount being USD 375. (See Table 5.5 for loan sizes of the surveyed group
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members). The first loan is usually small (range from approximately USD 89 to 200 ).5 However,
successful loan repayment gives access to another bigger loan. 10% of the loan is usually deducted
during disbursement as a loan security deposit; however, this is refundable after the full repayment
of the loan. Also, 1% of the loan is deducted as a loan appraisal fee and 0.25% for a credit life
insurance contribution.6
Table 5.5: Loan sizes of the members of the surveyed groups
Group name Mean Minimum Maximum
Sinai 914,754 300,000 2,200,000
Wema 1,160,714 700,000 1,500,000
Galilaya 910,000 200,000 2,200,000
Ushindi 833,333 400,000 1,350,000
Mkombozi 1,025,000 300,000 1,500,000
Sayuni 831,148 300,000 1,900,000
Tafuteni 812,195 250,000 1,700,000
Utukufu 879,032 300,000 2,000,000
Maendeleo 860,870 300,000 1,700,000
Rehema 691,964 300,000 1,250,000
Overall 840,758 200,000 2,200,000
Source: Field survey, 2018.
Note: USD 1 was equivalent to TShs 2240 at the time of the survey
.
BRAC Tanzania repayment schedules for all loan sizes are uniform: weekly repayments of a
loan are started soon after disbursement and are divided into 20 or 40 equal installments including
both principal and interest. As shown in Table 5.6, most members had 40-week loans (83.6%).
The lending interest rates for 20- and 40-week loans are 13% and 25%, respectively. Members
reported various uses of the loans, including the purchase of stocks for retail businesses (38.5%),
education expenditure (20.6%), and construction (17.9%), among others.
5The loan sizes may be changed or adjusted occasionally by the management.
6The insurance pay in the event of death or permanent disability of the members and is valid during the loan term
and covers the members immediately after loan disbursement.
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Table 5.6: Loan term and uses by members of the surveyed groups
Frequency Percent
Loan term
20 weeks 54 16.4
40 weeks 276 83.6
Total 330 100
Loan uses
Purchasing stocks for retailing businesses 127 38.5
Purchasing livestock 16 4.9
Purchasing land 16 4.9
Purchasing motorcycle 4 1.2
Crop production 15 4.6
Construction 59 17.9
Education expenditure (school fees) 68 20.6
Others 25 7.6
Total 330 100
Source: Field survey, 2018.
Note: Group members were asked information about the two latest loans.
5.4 Repayment Performance of BRAC Tanzania’s Microfinance Program
One of the issues extensively discussed in group lending programs is repayment performance
(Sharma and Zeller, 1997; Wenner, 1995; Al-Azzam et al., 2012). Repayment of loans is an
important measure for the success and sustainability of these programs. Some group lending
programs, such as those of Grameen Bank and BancoSol, have shown great success, achieving
high repayment rates. However, this does not imply that repayment rates are uniformly high for
all institutions. Yang (2012) pointed out that in some areas of China, default rates of group loans
have reached 50%.
Before discussing repayment performance, it is important to understand the loan classifica-
tions since the definitions differ from one institution to another. According to BRAC Tanzania,
loans are classified as either current or overdue. Current loans are those paid on maturity due dates
or not yet due. Loans are overdue when one or more installments (i.e., both the principal and inter-
est) have not been paid on time. “On time” in this context refers to the exact date as stipulated in
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the loan agreement given to the member at the time of disbursement. Overdue loans are classified
as current payment missed, late loans, and non-interest-bearing loans (NIBL).
Late loans are further classified as “late one” and “late two.” Loans will be considered as late
one after remaining unpaid for six months. After that, it will be considered as late two for the next
period of six months. A penalty of 3% of the unpaid amount (principal and interest) is charged
monthly for late loans. After late two, overdue loans are considered as NIBL, and no interest is
charged on these loans. After being NIBL, the loan can be submitted for the write-off (Figure
5.1). Apart from that, any loan can be written-off due to death or any other disaster affecting the
livelihood of the member. Loans
Current Loans Overdue Loans
Current payment 
missed
Late loans Non-Interest 
Bearing Loans 
(NIBL)
Late 1
(6 months)
Late 2
(6 months)
Subjected to a monthly penalty 
of 3% of the amount which is 
not yet repaid
No interest charged, but after  1 
year the loan can be written-off
Figure 5.1: Classification of loans offered by BRAC Tanzania
Source: Author, 2017
Repayment performance is studied through a variety of measures, such as portfolios at risk,
write-offs, and provision expenses (D’espallier et al., 2011). In this study, repayment performance
is measured by three financial ratios: the proportion of the portfolio that is overdue (arrears), the
proportion of the portfolio that is overdue by over 30 days (portfolio at risk), and the percentage
of the loan portfolio that is written-off. For group members, repayment performance is measured
as the percentage of members with and without repayment delays or defaults. The averages of all
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three ratios used in the analysis of repayment performance, as shown in Table 5.7, were less than
5%, implying that approximately 96% of all loans are recovered. In the case of group members,
there was a delay in only three loans, which represents 0.9% of the total loans; and there were no
defaults.
Even though the average repayment performance of the Arusha region is lower compared to
the national average, it is still regarded as good. According to Stauffenberg and Jansson (2003),
any portfolio at risk (PAR30) figure exceeding 10% should be cause for concern. In the case of
BRAC Tanzania, PAR30 is below 10%, implying high repayment performance.
Table 5.7: Repayment performance of BRAC Tanzania
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
BRAC Tanzania (all regions)
Arrear rate (%) 3.5 0.9 1.6 1.5 0.4 0.2 0.6 1.2
PAR30 (%) 3.3 1 1.9 1.4 0.4 0.2 0.7 1.2
Write-off ratio (%) 2 2 1.5 1.7 1.3 0.5 0.3 0.5
BRAC Tanzania (Arusha region)
Arrear rate (%) N.A. 3.7 4.7 9.1 5.3 0.6 0.3 2.8
PAR30 (%) N.A. 4.8 4.9 9.6 4.9 0.5 0.4 3.2
Write-off ratio (%) N.A. 1.5 2.2 0 4.3 0.3 0.2 0.4
Group members surveyed (177 members)
Frequency Percentage
Any delay in repayment 3 0.9
No delay in repayment 327 99.1
Default 0 0
Total 330 100
Source: Field survey, 2018.
Notes:
1. Arrear rate is the ratio of overdue loans to the total outstanding loans.
2. Portfolio at risk refers to outstanding balance of all loans that have an amount overdue in this case the amount
overdue over 30 days is used.
3. Write off ratio represents the loans that the institution has removed from its books because of a substantial
doubt that they will be recovered and is computed as the amount written off over outstanding loans.
4. N.A. means data were not available.
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5.5 Institutional Factors that Determine Repayment Performance of BRAC Tanzania
Frequent client visit by BRAC Tanzania staff
BRAC Tanzania staff visit clients frequently to ensure on-time repayment. Also, by meeting
weekly during group meetings, credit officers get to know their clients well. This information
can provide loan officers with early warnings about emerging problems, which can be followed
by immediate reactions in the case of arrears. In the study of group lending programs in Eritrea,
Hermes et al. (2005) found that regular visits by the group leader reduced the probability of moral
hazard. In Hermes et al. (2005) study the frequency of visits was tested for the group leader and
not the microfinance staff but it still showed the role of frequent client visits. In contrast, Wenner
(1995), in a study of FINCA’s group credit program in Costa Rica, found that the number of
FINCA extension visits was positively correlated with delinquency, indicating that FINCA may
sense that a group is in trouble and attempt to visit more often.
Weekly repayment schedule implemented by BRAC Tanzania
The weekly repayment schedule implemented by BRAC Tanzania makes it easier for group mem-
bers to repay in small installments. A weekly collection of repayment installments is one of the
key features of microfinance that is believed to reduce default risk in the absence of collateral and
make lending to the poor viable (Field and Pande, 2008). According to Yunus (2003), borrow-
ers find frequent repayment process easier than having to accumulate money to pay a lump sum
because their lives are always under strain.
When BRAC in Bangladesh experimented with moving from weekly repayments to biweekly
repayments, delinquencies rose, and BRAC quickly retreated to its weekly scheme (Armendáriz
and Morduch, 2010). In the interviews with BRAC Tanzania officials during the survey, the offi-
cials reported that BRAC Tanzania also implemented the biweekly repayment schedule in some
71
of its old branches. However, there was a drop-in repayment which made BRAC Tanzania retrieve
to the weekly repayment schedule.
Strict loan approval and monitoring process by BRAC Tanzania staff
BRAC Tanzania staff approves new loans by visiting the business or home to confirm the pres-
ence of income-generating activities. The staff visit prior to loan approval ensures the borrower’s
creditworthiness. For example, one microlender in Russia relies heavily on staff visits to applicant
homes and businesses, rather than just on business documents (Zeitinger, 1996). In addition, for
BRAC Tanzania, larger loans, from USD 760 to USD 2,231, are approved by top management,
such as regional managers and senior regional managers. (See Table 8.4 in the Appendix for
BRAC Tanzania loan approval authority).
Also, to ensure on-time repayments and group discipline, the loan officer signs member pass-
book with a red pen in case of any delay in repayment or absence from the group meetings. If
repayment delays and absence from meetings repeat many times next loan amount is reduced, and
in extreme cases, the loan can be denied. During the survey, one member loan application was
denied because of repeated absences in the weekly meetings.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the repayment performance of BRAC Tanzania group lending program,
one of the largest group lending programs in the country. A variety of measures like arrears,
portfolio at risk, and write-offs were used for the analysis. Results show a low level of arrears,
low portfolio at risk, and fewer write-offs, implying high repayment performance. The members
of the surveyed groups represent the best-performing groups in the study area with no defaults and
very few delays.
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Chapter 6.
Determinants of Repayment Performance in Group Lending: Empirical Evidence
from BRAC Tanzania
6.1 Introduction
In chapter five, the repayment performance of BRAC Tanzania group lending is presented. The
results show a low level of arrears, low portfolio at risk, and fewer write-offs, implying high repay-
ment performance. The members of the surveyed groups represent the best-performing groups in
the study area with no defaults and very few delays. However, due to small data and little variation
in the data set empirical analysis could not be performed. Therefore, this chapter aims to empiri-
cally examine the determinants of repayment performance of BRAC Tanzania’s group lending for
a better understanding of the factors for repayment so that they could be manipulated accordingly
to enhance repayment.
The question about repayment determinants is critical because of the strongest appeal of mi-
crofinance programs in achieving high repayment rates in making very small loans to a large
number of poor. The high repayment rates of these programs have led observers to believe that
lending to the poor might not be as risky as has been traditionally assumed and microcredit is a
potentially viable business operation.
6.2 Determinants of the Repayment in Group Lending: A Literature Review
One of the measuring devices for the success of the group-based lending program is its rate of
repayment. Successful programs like Grameen Bank and Bancosol show high repayment rates
while reaching millions of poor borrowers. The high repayment performance of these programs is
attributed to their ability to curb the problems arising from information asymmetry. As discussed
in the theoretical literature, before loan disbursement most lenders face the problem of adverse
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selection. In principle, group lending can mitigate this inefficiency by encouraging applicants to
self-select the best partners. It is expected that borrowers from the same village have sufficient
information about the incomes, repayment capacities, and creditworthiness of neighboring house-
holds, and that they will use this information to form homogeneous groups. However, after the
loan disbursements, the MFIs may be confronted with moral hazards and enforcement problems.
Under the threat of being excluded from future loans if one group member defaults, the group
has the incentive to monitor their peers to use the loans in profitable ways and to exert pressure
to make a potential defaulter reconsider his or her decision. Further, each member will support
others if they face repayment difficulties (Figure 6.1).
A group of 
potential 
borrowers 
Apply for the 
Loan
RepaymentInvestment
Risks
Failed investment Unwillingness to pay
Problems
Adverse 
Selection
(To what clients 
you should lend?)
Ex-ante Moral 
Hazard
(What investment 
is suitable?)
Limited Liability
(Can the borrower 
ensure repayment?)
Ex-post Moral 
Hazard
(How to enforce 
repayment?)
Theoretical 
Solutions
Peer Selection
Peer Monitoring 
and 
MFI Monitoring
Peer Support
(Joint Liability)
Peer Pressure
(Enforcement through 
Sanctions)
Figure 6.1: Group lending: A theoretical model
Source:(Simtowe et al., 2006)
Several empirical studies have tested the validity of this theory and highlight the importance
of different measures, such as peer screening, peer monitoring, peer pressure, social ties, and other
factors in examining repayment performance. Presented below are some of the empirical research
on the determinants on repayment performance in group lending.
Wenner (1995) uses data of 25 groups from FINCA in Costa Rica. He categorizes his data
into three types: groups with no loan delinquency, groups with internal loan delinquency only, and
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groups with external delinquency. Internal delinquency means that one (or more) member(s) did
not repay his (their) share, but the group did meet its obligation to the lender. External delinquency
means that the group failed to repay to the lender (thus both internal and external delinquency
has taken place). Consequently, Wenner (1995) has two dependent variables, namely, internal
delinquency and external delinquency. Binomial probit, multinomial logit, and tobit models are
used in the analysis. Independent variables measure group characteristics such as informal and
formal screening, group savings, and other variables such as the group’s organizational strength,
infrastructure indexes, and visits by program officers to groups. Wenner (1995) finds internal
delinquency to be related negatively with formal screening and positively with visits.
The first result suggests that groups that have written codes on how members have to behave
(formal screening) experience less internal delinquency. The second result, visits by credit officer
to groups, indicates that more visits generate more internal delinquency and seems to be an unex-
pected result. Wenner (1995) suggests that a higher number of visits might reflect extra attention
given to a perceived ‘problem’ group. In case of external delinquency, he finds formal screening
to be negatively related and significant, and informal screening and infrastructure indices to be
positive and significant. These results indicate that groups with written code of group rules and
regulations show less external delinquency. On the other hand, groups that are located in areas
with good infrastructural facilities show higher external delinquency indicating that these groups
have other alternative sources of credit. Informal screening is found to have an unexpected sign,
i.e., informal screening instead of being a check against delinquency is positively correlated with
delinquency.
Matin (1997) uses data of 246 borrowers from the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh. His dependent
variable is a dummy variable, which equals one if the loan is not fully repaid at the date due. He
uses independent variables indicating borrowers’ level of education, housing loan, and area of
land used, years of membership, alternative credit sources, and other personal characteristics.
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Using a logit model, Matin (1997) finds that education and area of operated land were negatively
significant, suggesting that groups that consist of members who have some schooling and have land
in use below a certain threshold value have a lower probability of showing repayment problems.
In contrast, Matin (1997) finds that having a housing loan, the length of membership, other credit
sources and total land in use beyond the threshold level to be positively significant. These results
imply that a member with housing loan might be burdened by this loan and show delays in his
repayments. Similarly, the results indicate that members who have been clients of the lending
program for many years might show slackness in their repayment. Likewise, members who have
other credit sources and who have land use above the threshold level have a higher probability of
showing repayment problems. This might be attributed to the fact that these borrowers have other
credit opportunities or that they already have accumulated so much assets that they start to give
less value to future access to loans from the program.
Wydick (1999) uses data of 137 groups from FUNDAP, a group-based lending program in
Guatemala. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equaling one if a group has a good
repayment record based on lender reports. The independent variables are classified into group so-
cial ties, group pressure, and group monitoring and control variables. Out of several independent
variables, Wydick (1999) finds average distance and knowledge of weekly sales of other mem-
bers to be the only significant variables. Both variables are peer monitoring proxies, which were
negatively and positively significant, respectively. The results suggest that the longer the average
distance in kilometers between group members’ businesses, the weaker the monitoring ability and
the lower repayment rate. In case of knowledge of weekly sales of other members, members are
asked if they know sales of other group members and he found that the more group members know
the weekly sales of each other, the better the enforcement ability and the higher repayment rate of
the group.
Kinyondo and Okurut (2009) use data from 150 group clients from FINCA and PRIDE,
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group-based lending programs in Tanzania. The dependent variable is equal to one if the loan
was fully repaid within the specified period of a loan contract, otherwise zero. The indepen-
dent variables include gender, experience (number of the years the group has participated in the
credit program of a given MFI), training time (amount of time in weeks that MFI devoted to train
group member on issues such as loan management), transaction costs, sanction index, group size,
education level and homogeneity index which assess whether members of the group have similar
socio-economic background. Using the logit model, Kinyondo and Okurut (2009) find experience,
training time, and sanctions have positive and significant effects on loan repayment performance.
On the other hand, transaction costs and group size have a negative and significant effect on re-
payment performance.
Al-Azzam et al. (2012) use data from a survey of 160 urban borrowing groups of the Mi-
crofund for Women in Jordan. Al-Azzam et al. (2012) investigate the effect of screening, peer
monitoring, group pressure, and social ties on borrowing groups’ repayment behavior. The de-
pendent variable used captures the intensity of default measured by the total number of days of
late repayment after each due date. The independent variables were categorized into five groups:
control, screening, monitoring, group pressure and social ties variables. The results suggest that
peer monitoring, group pressure, and social ties reduce delinquency. The results also uncover
interesting evidence about the role of religion in improving repayment performance.
Qinlan and Izumida (2013) use data 245 farm households in Guizhou province, China. The
dependent variable is dichotomous, with a value of one if the sample borrower completed repay-
ment before the due date. The independent variables are categorized into four categories. The
first category includes the number of family members, the number of household members in the
labor force, age of the household head, sex of the borrower, and loan size. The second category
of variables includes household’s income and income related factors. The third category includes
variables that measure borrower’s expectation of future loans. The fourth category uses five vari-
77
ables on group member’s homogeneity and the intensity of social ties. These variables include:
percentage of group members who are relatives, percentage of group members who are from the
same village, percentage of group members who have cooperative relationships with the respon-
dent, farthest geographic distance from the respondent’s house to a peer’s house, and a dummy
variable for whether any family member is a village official. Using the logit model, Qinlan and
Izumida (2013) find a higher degree of acquaintanceship in a group, migrant income, and employ-
ment in government agencies positively improved the chances of repayment. However, factors
such as threatening to withhold defaulters’ future loans and higher household incomes did not
improve repayment performance.
Noglo and Androuais (2015) use data of 36 groups from FUCEC and WAGES, group-based
lending programs in Togo. The dependent variable is a binary dummy, which equals to one if a
group had at least one late repayment and zero if the group paid all installments on time. The in-
dependent variables are categorized into five groups: control, selection, monitoring, social capital,
and peer pressure variables. Using the logit model, Noglo and Androuais (2015) find all forms
of pressure between jointly liable debtors, the selection, belonging to the same religion and the
large size group are ineffective. However, mutual supervision (visits between members), external
credit options and the homogeneity of the group in terms of gender, ethnic group and occupation
contribute positively and significantly to excellent repayment performance.
In summary, the existing empirical studies highlight the importance of different measures
such as peer screening, peer monitoring, peer pressure, and social ties among other factors. Some
of the empirical results confirm the commonly held assumptions while others do not.
6.3 Data Collection and Sample Selection
The survey was conducted in twelve BRAC Tanzania branches in the Arusha region. Groups
were randomly selected from the list which was obtained from the regional office. A total of 183
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groups were surveyed. The survey was conducted during group meetings and was questions were
administered to all group members who were present during the meeting.1 The group members
were asked several questions which include the group size, age of the group, if they ever rejected
an applicant, if the group has overdue, measures used by the group to ensure on time repayment
and group members’ characteristics.
6.4 Methodology
6.4.1 Determinants of repayment: variables description
Dependent variable
The dependent variable is characterized by the measure of repayment represented by the overdue
variable.2 The latter is a dummy variable that equals one if a group had any member with overdue
amounts and zero if the group has no member with overdue amounts (paid all installments on
time) at the time of the survey.
Independent variables
The independent variables are grouped into six categories: peer screening, peer monitoring, peer
pressure, social ties, joint liability, and control variables. See Table 8.5 in Appendices for a com-
plete list of the variables used in the analysis and expected signs.
6.4.2 Explanation of key variables
Control variables
The analysis uses five control variables: percentage of members who are married, percentage of
members with permanent residence, a dummy variable indicating whether the group is located
in a rural area, age of the group, and a dummy variable indicating whether an outside guarantor
1Group meetings attendance is compulsory and meetings are held every week except for the public holidays.
2Overdue is one of the repayment performance measure. According to BRAC Tanzania, loans are overdue when
one or more installments (i.e., both the principal and interest) have not been paid on time. “On time” in this context
refers to the exact date as stipulated in the loan agreement given to the member at the time of disbursement. The details
of overdue classification are presented in chapter 5.
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cooperates to ensure the loan’s repayment. In the previous survey, members were asked if they
have any problem related to repayment who did they ask for help and most of the members reported
to ask help from their husbands. Therefore, the hypothesis is, the group with a high proportion of
married members will have lower overdue hence, a negative sign is expected. Another hypothesis
is the higher percentage of members with permanent residence in the group will lower overdue
since it will hard to run away from their repayment obligations due to residency status. The
negative sign is also expected.
In terms of the group location, the hypothesis is that rural groups place the greater the value
on the credit services since other alternatives are less available hence; rural groups are expected
to perform better than urban groups in order to avoid a loss of future access to credit. A negative
sign is expected. The relationship between age of the group and repayment performance may
go both ways. On the one hand, older group members use their ties more efficiently to enhance
repayment performance (Khandker, 2012). On the other hand, in older groups there may be a
so-called matching problem (Paxton, 1996). With time, the credit needs of the group members
may vary, possibly leading to tensions within the group. Moreover, if group members have known
each other for a long time, they may be reluctant to monitor and sanction each other. The expected
sign on the age of the group would therefore be ambiguous.
One of the requirements to obtain BRAC Tanzania loans is to have a guarantor outside the
group.3 BRAC Tanzania mainly prefers close family members such as husband, father and son
to be a guarantor. However, relatives, landlords and neighbors can also be guarantors. In case
the member fails to repay, guarantors are supposed to help in repaying or making follow up to
ensure the amount is repaid. However, in some cases guarantors do not offer the cooperation
or any help in ensuring the repayment is made. A dummy variable is used to capture whether
guarantors cooperate to ensure the repayment. It is expected that the groups in which guarantors
3The outside guarantors can be one guarantor or two guarantors depending on the loan sizes. Loan sizes from TShs
one million (approximately USD 450) require two guarantors.
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cooperate to ensure repayment will have low overdue in comparison to groups which guarantors
do not cooperate. The sign for the coefficient is expected to be negative.
Social ties variables
Several studies have shown that the success of group lending depends on its ability to harness
social ties among borrowers (Karlan, 2007; Cassar et al., 2007). The social ties are measured by
the percentage of relatives in the group. Since information flows are expected to be better among
relatives, there would be less moral hazard associated with bailing out a relative who is unable to
meet the repayment requirements. But in some cases it is difficult to impose sanctions on relatives
and in this way dilute the enforcement process. Hence for the measure of relative, the sign is
ambiguous.
Joint liability variables variables
As presented in chapter 5, joint liability is officially not used in BRAC Tanzania anymore, but some
form of joint liability still exists. Members still have to contribute to other members repayments.4
Two variables are used to measure the influence of this form of joint liability. The first variable is
captured by a dummy variable which is equal to one if the group has ever contributed to another
member who had missed payment or repayment problems and zero otherwise. Additionally, a
dummy variable that takes a value of one if contributing to other members is compulsory is used.
Some members admitted they contributed to other members in the past, but they are no longer
contributing.5 Since joint liability provisions are associated with higher repayment rates, negative
signs are expected for both variables.
4In order to reduce the overdue amounts and ensure high repayment performance some of BRAC Tanzania’s com-
munity organizers, also known as credit officers, continue to impose some form of joint liability. In addition some of
the groups are still implementing joint liability as a means of group solidarity and mutual help.
5The reason mentioned by the member on the question why they are no longer contributing for other members
however is not that because BRAC Tanzania has converted to individual liability but because currently they are no
stubborn member or member with repayment problems in their groups.
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Screening variables
In order to highlight the selection, the survey asked if the group has ever rejected the applicants.
The variable used to capture is a dummy that equals to one if the group has ever rejected a person
who wanted to join. This variable measures the ability to group members to exclude members
from joining the group. We expect the groups that accept every applicant to have high overdue
rates relative to the groups that reject applicants and conducts screening. The negative sign is
expected.
Explanation of the variables
Peer monitoring can mitigate the moral hazard problems, however, in reality peer monitoring can
be costly. Theoretical models by Stiglitz (1990); Banerjee et al. (1994); Wydick (2001) show
monitoring between borrowers reduces moral hazard and increases group loan repayment. Many
researchers have validated the success of peer monitoring in relation to better repayment perfor-
mance (Hossain, 1988; Siamwalla et al., 1990; Goetz and Gupta, 1996). From the survey in this
study, different proxy variables are used to measure whether peer monitoring takes place within
group members.
The first proxy used is the distance between group members.6 Another variable used to mea-
sure the geographical proximity between group members is the number of hamlets (for rural
groups) or streets (for urban groups) relative to the group size. The groups composed of mem-
bers from a few hamlets or streets are likely to know each other better and monitor each other
much easier than members coming from many hamlets or streets. If the distance between group
members increases monitoring becomes more difficult and thus the probability of moral hazard
increases. A positive sign is expected for both variables.
The third proxy is the percentage of group members who work at the same place. The hypoth-
6The distance between group members was measured by the difference in walking distance from the member who
is living nearest to where the group meets and member living farthest from where the group meets. During the ques-
tionnaire pre-testing, members were asked distance in kilometers, but members could not estimate the distance in
kilometers; hence it was changed to walking distance in minutes.
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esis is that the higher the number of members who works at the same place, the lower the overdue.
Members who work at the same place may facilitate monitoring due to the low cost of obtaining
information which can lead to low overdue hence, a negative sign is expected. The fourth proxy
is a dummy variable indicating whether the group has internal rules in oral or in written form
.7 Because rules can increase transparency and therefore reduce intra-group friction and costs of
coordination, groups that have internal rules are hypothesized to have lower overdue, hence a neg-
ative sign is expected. The final proxy of peer monitoring is group size. The group size indicated
the number of active members in a group. The hypothesis is that the bigger the group, the more
imperfect are flows of information likely to be between members. Hence, problems arising out of
asymmetric information make monitoring and enforcing costly and less effective. The rates of de-
fault are therefore expected to increase with group size. The sign of the coefficient is hypothesized
to be positive.
Peer pressure or sanction variables
As demonstrated theoretically by Besley and Coate (1995), social sanctions in group-based lend-
ing can lead to increased repayment rates. Given that sanctions are sufficiently strong moral hazard
can be reduced. Sanctions also help in the enforcement of rules and regulations and smooth func-
tioning of the group. Peer pressure or sanctions is measured by two variables. The first one is
the percentage of group members who are excluded because of default or being stubborn. The
fear of exclusion from the group compels the members to fulfill their obligations; negative sign is
expected. The second one is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a group has ever seized
fellow group member’s physical properties. A negative sign is also expected for this variable.
7All groups’ internal rules where oral, no group had written rule.
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6.5 Results and Discussion
6.5.1 Descriptive results
Table 6.2 descriptively compare groups with overdue to those with no overdue. Three types of
results are presented: results based on the total sample, on urban groups only, and on rural groups
only. A t-test comparison was conducted between the labelled columns to examine if there are
any significant differences between groups with overdue to those with no overdue in the overall
sample, on urban groups only, and on rural groups only.
In general, groups with overdue have less internal rules, a smaller share of married group
members, older, and their guarantors were reported to be less cooperative in ensuring repayments.
On average, 44 percent of groups with overdue reported having internal rules, which is 41 percent
less in comparison to groups with no overdue. For groups with overdue, about 73 percent of the
members are married, they were established about ten years ago, and only 23 percent of these
groups reported that their guarantors are cooperative to ensure repayments. This is significantly
different from groups with no overdue in which about 86 percent of their members are married,
on average, they were established seven years ago, and 90 percent of them reported that their
guarantors are cooperative to ensure repayments.
There are additional differences that appear to be significant in urban and rural groups. Groups
with overdue in urban areas have few cases of rejecting applicants, members live far from one
another and only a few of them work at the same place. These groups have more cases of excluding
stubborn or default members and most of them do not consider contributing to another member as
a compulsory principle. The above factors do not appear to be significant for groups with overdue
in rural areas. Contrary to urban areas, groups with overdue in the rural area have more cases of
contributing to member’s repayments in comparison to those with no overdue in the same area.
This variable is not significant in urban groups because even though it is not considered to be
compulsory in most groups, more than 80 percent of urban groups reported having contributed to
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the repayments of other members.
The descriptive analysis suggests that, generally, peer monitoring measures are more associ-
ated with overdue, but there are differences depending on where the groups are located. For urban
groups, peer screening, peer monitoring, peer pressure, and joint liability measures are signifi-
cantly associated with overdue whereas for rural groups, only peer monitoring and joint liability
measures are associated with overdue. The results suggest the need to conduct an empirical anal-
ysis to examine what among the factors discussed above are determinants of overdue.
85
86
Table 6.1: Descriptive analysis results
Total sample Urban only Rural only
VARIABLES Overdue=1 Overdue=0 Difference Overdue=1 Overdue=0 Difference Overdue=1 Overdue=0 Difference
(1) (2) (1) - (2) (3) (4) (3) - (4) (5) (6) (5) - (6)
Peer screening
Group has ever rejected applicants (dummy) 0.50 0.61 -0.11 0.49 0.71 -0.22** 0.53 0.50 0.03
Peer monitoring
Distance differences (minutes) 38.39 37.17 1.22 38.77 30.75 8.02* 37.47 44.36 -6.89
Number of hamlets/streets relative to group size 0.21 0.18 0.03* 0.23 0.20 0.03 0.16 0.16 -0.00
Members who work at the same place (%) 15.66 25.17 -9.51*** 13.51 23.67 -10.17*** 21.00 26.85 -5.85
Group has the internal rules (dummy) 0.44 0.85 -0.41*** 0.40 0.84 -0.44*** 0.53 0.86 -0.33***
Group size 17.15 18.85 -1.70 16.28 16.61 -0.33 19.32 21.36 -2.04
Peer pressure and sanctions
Excluded stubborn/default members (%) 41.00 22.64 18.35* 49.56 27.81 21.75* 19.82 16.86 2.96
Group has ever seized member’s properties
(dummy)
0.18 0.10 0.08 0.21 0.18 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.09
Social ties
Members who are relatives (%) 7.60 6.29 1.31 4.95 2.59 2.36 14.16 10.43 3.73
Joint liability
Group has contributed for another member’s re-
payment (dummy)
0.86 0.76 0.10 0.85 0.88 -0.02 0.89 0.64 0.25**
Contributing for another member is compulsory
(dummy)
0.30 0.59 -0.29*** 0.32 0.73 -0.41*** 0.26 0.44 -0.18
Control variables
Members who are married (%) 73.07 86.14 -13.07*** 68.25 83.65 -15.40*** 85.00 88.92 -3.92*
Members with permanent residence (%) 66.35 76.07 -9.73*** 57.65 64.32 -6.67 87.85 89.23 -1.38
Age of the group (years) 10.27 7.29 2.99*** 10.70 8.49 2.22*** 9.21 5.94 3.27***
Guarantor cooperates to ensure repayment
(dummy)
0.23 0.90 -0.67*** 0.17 0.82 -0.65*** 0.37 0.98 -0.61***
Observations (Number of groups) 66 106 47 56 19 50
Source: Author, 2019*** denotes significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%.
Note: Only 172 groups could be used for the analysis because some of the groups had incomplete data
6.5.2 Econometric results
In this section, the empirical results on the relationship between overdue variable (a measure of
the repayment performance) and its determinants are presented. A logit model is used to estimate
the effects of independent variables in decreasing overdue and ensuring high repayment. Table 6.2
below shows the results of the logit regression.
The results show that peer screening decreases overdue rates in rural groups. This implies
the higher the screening, the lower the likelihood of having overdue in rural groups. In total
sample and urban groups, negative sign is observed as expected; however, it is non-significant.
In the survey area, it was observed that in rural areas, members tend to know each well than in
the urban areas. The results seem to provide some evidence that in contexts where people are
well-acquainted with one another, peer selection is helpful to mitigating adverse selection issues
and improving group lending repayment rates. These results are similar to Wenner (1995); Ghatak
(1999); Van Tassel (1999); Laffont and N’Guessan (2000); Sharma and Zeller (1997), that groups
that screen other member’s exhibit relatively high repayment rates. This finding contradicts the
findings of Noglo and Androuais (2015); Verhelle and Berlage (2003), which shows self-selection
(screening) raises the probability of arrears.
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Table 6.2: Determinants of overdue (Logit Model)
(1) (2) (3)
Overdue loans Overdue loans Overdue loans
VARIABLES Tota sample Urban only Rural only
Peer screening
Group has ever rejected applicants (dummy) -0.69 (0.516) -0.25 (1.186) -1.55** (0.771)
Peer monitoring
Distance difference (minutes) -0.01 (0.006) -0.01 (0.019) -0.02 (0.016)
Number of hamlets/streets relative to group size 0.32 (2.716) -0.52 (4.304) 3.29 (6.967)
Members who work at the same place (%) -0.03* (0.018) -0.02 (0.018) -0.05 (0.047)
Group has the internal rules (dummy) -0.87 (0.577) -1.67 (1.500) -0.93 (1.145)
Group size 0.09** (0.045) 0.15** (0.071) 0.19* (0.113)
Peer pressure or sanctions
Excluded sturbborn/default members (%) 0.00 (0.004) -0.00 (0.007) -0.00 (0.011)
Group has ever seized member’s properties (dummy) -0.30 (0.830) 0.50 (0.881) 0.36 (1.474)
Social ties
Members who are relatives (%) -0.01 (0.027) -0.09 (0.060) 0.03 (0.045)
Joint liability
Group has contributed for member’s repayment (dummy) 0.59 (0.780) -0.85 (1.676) 1.54 (0.953)
Contributing for another member is compulsory (dummy) -2.47*** (0.810) -2.22*** (0.830) -3.26 (2.522)
Control variables
Members who are married (%) -0.09*** (0.029) -0.14** (0.053) -0.19*** (0.061)
Members with permanent residence (%) -0.03 (0.026) 0.03* (0.017) -0.11** (0.049)
Age of the group (years) 0.08 (0.069) 0.19 (0.131) 0.06 (0.114)
Guarantor cooperates to ensure repayment (dummy) -4.06*** (0.760) -4.91*** (1.652) -5.81** (2.673)
Group is located in rural area (dummy) 1.88 (1.353)
Constant 11.02*** (3.229) 10.99* (5.847) 27.95*** (6.653)
Observations 172 103 69
Log likelihood -46.37 -22.97 -16.09
Chi-Square 51.98*** 61.89*** 40.62***
Pseudo R-Square 0.595 0.677 0.604
Source: Author, 2019*** denotes significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
In the case of peer monitoring, five variables were used, but only two variables were signif-
icant; the percentage of members who work at the same place and group size. The signs of both
these significant variables were as expected. However, the variable percentage of members who
work at the same place was only significant in the total sample, whereas group size was significant
in the total sample and the urban and rural groups’ samples.
Members who works at the same place may easily monitor each other, leading to the reduc-
tion of overdue rates. As expected, as groups increase in size, monitoring and enforcing become
more costly and less effective. This implies that the smaller the group size is, the lower is its
likelihood of having overdue amounts. These findings are similar to that of Kinyondo and Okurut
(2009); Van Bastelaer and Leathers (2006), that smaller groups are performing better. Contrary,
Zeller (1998); Feroze et al. (2011); Wydick (1999), found that the larger group size improves the
repayment performance suggesting the positive effect of group size on diversification of risks.
However, Zeller (1996) provides a notion that when group size surpasses manageable levels will
increase costs of coordination, moral hazard, and free-rider problems.
Both variables which are used to measure the peer pressure or sanctions are non-significant.
The results suggest that the presence of actions such as the exclusion of stubborn members or
defaulters and physical seizure of the assets are not significant factors in improving the repayment
performance in the study area. These results are similar to that of Van Bastelaer and Leathers
(2006) and are in contrast with studies that show peer pressure effect on the repayment perfor-
mance of the groups. Field studies in Burkina Faso indicate that repayment rates are high because
the threat of ex-post peer pressure is carried to extremes and has even resulted in the forced sales
of household items in order to recover the loan amount (World Bank, 1997). Similar results have
been found by Ahlin and Townsend (2007); Bassem (2008); Wydick (1999), which suggest that
pressure exercised by group members on the defaulting member reduces the repayment problems
considerably.
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Joint liability is captured by two dummy variables: first one is indicating whether the group
has ever contributed to another member who had missed payment or had repayment problems and
the second one is indicating whether contributing to another member is compulsory. The first
variable is not significant while the second variable had a negative sign as expected and significant
in the total and urban groups sample and non-significant in rural groups sample. This might be
due to the effect of effective screening in rural areas especially if there is existence of some form
of joint liability.
Three out of five control variables are significant. The percentage of married members in the
group seems to be one of the most important factors that determine the repayment performance.
The sign of the coefficient is negative as expected and significant in total, urban and rural groups
sample implying that the higher the percentage of married members in a group, the lower the like-
lihood of having overdue. In the previous survey, members were asked if they have any problem
related to repayment who did they ask for help. Out of 135 members who seek help, 113 members
(84%) report asking help from husbands or other family members. This suggests that group mem-
bers rely heavily on the family to ensure repayment. This result also indicates that intra-house
exchanges also play an important role in microcredit, as group members may at times rely on their
partner’s support for loan repayment. Postelnicu et al. (2015); Ayogyam et al. (2014) find the same
results.
Another control variable that is significant is the percentage of members who have permanent
residence. This variable is non-significant in the total sample but is significant in rural and urban
groups. In the rural groups’ sample, the sign is negative as expected, implying that, the higher the
percentage of members with permanent residence, the lower the likelihood of having overdue
amount. This is different in urban groups where positive sign is observed, implying that the
higher the percentage of members with permanent residence, the higher the overdue. This can be
explained by the fact having permanent residence can be one of the factors to obtain credit from
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other lenders especially in urban areas where there are many alternative sources of credit. Most of
the lenders, including BRAC Tanzania prefer members with permanent residence. Having other
credit options or ability to borrow from different sources can lead to multiple borrowing which can
increase the chances of having overdue amounts. Having multiple loans is forbidden by BRAC
Tanzania. However, during the qualitative interviews with members and staff, it was reported that
some members especially in the urban areas have repayment problems because they have other
loans apart from that of BRAC Tanzania. This is in line with the results of Wenner (1995); Matin
(1997), which show the existence of other credit sources may lead to repayment problems.
The cooperation of outside guarantor was measured by a dummy variable and the result is
significant in total, urban and rural groups. The sign is negative as expected. The results imply
that if the outside guarantor cooperates in case of a problem related to the borrower the overdue can
be reduced and repayment can be improved. In the study area some outside guarantors cooperate
with credit officers and group members in the making follow up in case there is problem related
to the repayment. Generally, in some cases, the guarantor may pay the guaranteed debt.
6.6 Challenges of BRAC Tanzania’s Group Lending
This section presents some of the challenges of BRAC Tanzania’s microfinance program observed
and reported during field survey in the Arusha region.
6.6.1 High dropout rates
According to the results from the surveyed groups, most members who were present during group
formation had left the program.8 Based on the survey results, only 23 percent of the members
who were present during group formation are still in the groups. When the young groups in which
most members are still present are excluded, the percentage became even lower. Group members
8In dealing with dropouts there are cases where BRAC Tanzania merges the groups in order to minimize the costs
of serving small groups. For example, the group in which only five members remained after dropouts can be merged
with another group of fifteen members and form a group of twenty members.
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were asked about the status of members who were not in the group during the survey.9 25.4% of
groups reported that there were excluded after defaults, 55% percent of the groups reported that
they dropout voluntary, and 19.5% reports they are resting meaning that they are still members
and there is a chance they will take a loan in the future. These results show that dropouts are not
always associated with the exclusion due to defaults but there are other reasons.
Client dropouts over time even from the most successful organizations in the microfinance
sector is portrayed as a negative phenomenon by many practitioners because both MFI and clients
have much to gain from a long-term relationship. This study does not have the data to discuss the
reasons for voluntary dropouts. However, according to the previous studies, the dropouts may be
caused by several factors including a failure to meet borrowers’ financial needs, borrowers’ dissat-
isfaction with high transaction costs, loan type, loan size, term length, and repayment inflexibility
(Cohen, 2002; CGAP, 2000; Hulme et al., 1999; Meyer et al., 2002; Pagura and Growth, 2004;
Wright, 1997).
6.6.2 Costs incurred by members
Even though most BRAC Tanzania activities take place in the group meetings in the villages or
towns where the member lives, some activities such as loan disbursements and obtaining the new
passbooks take place in the branch offices which in some cases is located far from the villages
where members live. This was mostly observed in Karatu and Magugu branches in the Arusha
region.
The time spent in group meetings can be considered as another cost. The group meetings time
in most cases depends on the repayment collection status. When there are no repayment related
problems the meetings can take less than one hour to end but once there is any problem related to
repayment, meetings can take up to three hours or more. Despite the fact that this study has no
enough data to quantify these costs, they can be a burden to members.
9Nine new groups in which all members were still present were excluded.
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6.6.3 Forced contribution for the defaulters by staff
In the event of defaults members can voluntarily contribute for the defaulter but in some cases,
they are forced by BRAC Tanzania staff to contribute for the defaulters. This was observed from
several groups during the survey. This results from the fact that staff are required to keep the very
low levels of arrears. In some branches, staff are not allowed to return to the branch office on the
collection day without fully paid installments. In addition, junior staff especially the community
organizers face pressure from the senior staff for installment collection in order to keep up with
the organization targets.
In addition to the pressure to meet the organization targets, BRAC Tanzania staff are strictly
supervised. Each staff must go through evaluation twice a year based on the performance mea-
surement system (PMS), which evaluates staff performance on different aspects including the loan
recovery rate. Hussain (2015) argues that this kind of performance evaluation might be a reason
why BRAC (here refers to as BRAC Bangladesh) has high loan recovery than the mainstream
banking sector.
6.6.4 Staff fraud
Over the course of the field survey there were several reports of staff fraud issues. This includes
disbursement of fake loans, not returning all the repayments collected, stealing money and taking
loans in clients’ name. Brockington and Banks (2014); Banks et al. (2019) observed the same
cases in their study of BRAC Tanzania. Banks et al. (2019) added that this is used to be a major
issue in BRAC’s Bangladesh programs in the 1990s and 2000s. Out of 72 groups which reported
that there is a member in the group with overdue, six groups (8.3%) reported that those overdue
are related to staff fraud. The groups with no overdue reported similar cases that have happened
in the past. In 2016 in Monduli branch, there was a case related to staff taking loans out in clients’
names and disbursement of fake loans. This case leads to loss of trust by the members and many
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members left the program. It also resulted to organization loss of about TShs 70 million Tanzania.
(staff and member interviews, 2019).
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes the determinants of repayment performance of BRAC Tanzania and the
functions of the groups. The logit regression was used in the estimation of the determinants of the
repayment performance. The results confirm as well as contradict the views generally stated in
the literature. The contrast between rural groups and urban groups in the estimation is notewor-
thy. In urban groups, joint liability appears to be a significant factor in reducing overdue amounts,
whereas in rural groups, peer screening appears to be a significant factor in reducing the overdue
amounts. The empirical results also reveal the functions of the group are peer screening and peer
monitoring in rural groups while in urban groups the group function is limited to peer monitor-
ing. The results failed to prove the significance of peer pressure and social ties in ensuring the
repayment as discussed in the theory of group lending.
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Chapter 7.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
7.1 Main Findings
Tanzania is classified as a low-income country, with a high proportion of its population below
the poverty line. In Tanzania, as in most developing countries, access to financial services, espe-
cially those provided by formal MFIs, is very limited. This is mainly due to the lack of collateral
among low-income borrowers. Informal MFIs are also confronted with several challenges such as
unreliability and high interest rates, a common feature found in many developing countries.
Due to the reasons mentioned, semi-formal MFIs can be considered as a better option to
provide services to low-income borrowers due to the fact that they have introduced collateral sub-
stitutes. NGO MFIs have introduced group lending in which members form groups and guarantee
each other while cooperative-based MFIs (SACCOs) use savings as a collateral substitute where
members can borrow against their savings.
It is important to examine the performance of semi-formal MFIs so that challenges can be
identified and suggestions for future improvements can be offered. The good performance of
semi-MFIs will enhance the supply of financial services to the majority of poor Tanzanians and
help them in fighting against poverty.
This study focuses on various aspects of performance by using selected SACCOs and BRAC
Tanzania as representative semi–formal MFIs. In discussing the performance, this study first
examines the outreach of the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania in terms of credit expan-
sion. Second, the study analyzes the efficiency of the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania in
terms of operating costs. Third, it examines the repayment performance of BRAC Tanzania group
loans, and finally, it empirically assesses the factors that determine loan repayment performance of
BRAC Tanzania’s group loans. In analyzing the performance of these semi-formal MFIs, primary
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data collected from field surveys in the Arusha region were used. In addition, secondary data such
as financial statements and reports were also used.
The study finds notable differences between the selected SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania in var-
ious aspects. First, the selected SACCOs offer both credits and savings services, whereas BRAC
Tanzania offers only credit services; this is because NGO MFIs in Tanzania are not allowed to ac-
cept savings. Second, the selected SACCOs lends to individuals, while BRAC Tanzania uses group
lending. Third, BRAC Tanzania offers loans of a smaller size than the selected SACCOs suggest-
ing that BRAC Tanzania serves poorer borrowers than the selected SACCOs. Fourth, the interest
rates charged by BRAC Tanzania are considerably higher than those charged by the selected SAC-
COs. Fifth, BRAC Tanzania has higher operating costs than that of the selected SACCOs.
Regarding performance, the study finds that the representative semi-formal MFIs are success-
ful in increasing outreach through credit expansion. Although BRAC Tanzania is barred from
accepting deposits by regulations, SACCOs members benefit from access not only to credit ser-
vices but also to savings services. The difference in the level of outreach between BRAC Tanzania
and the selected SACCOs reflects the difference in their target clients, business orientation, and
mission. The selected SACCOs serve members who are united by a common bond, providing
them with bigger loans whereas BRAC Tanzania mainly focuses on poor women. The selected
SACCOs are also diversified in various aspects, such as their target clients, types of loan, and loan
amounts and durations, which suggests that the selected SACCOs serve a wider variety of clients.
In discussing efficiency, descriptive and empirical analyses were used. Based on the descrip-
tive analysis, the study did not find a clear trend in terms of efficiency for the analysis period.
To confirm this, a regression analysis was conducted. The results show that operating costs did
not decrease over time, implying that there was no efficiency gain, possibly due to a lack of cost
reduction innovations. BRAC Tanzania had higher operating costs than the selected SACCOs.
The observed difference is caused by the difference in the loan amounts offered by the selected
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SACCOs and BRAC Tanzania. The latter, on average, offers small-sized loans compared to those
offered by the selected SACCOs and managing very small-sized loans involves high transaction
costs per loan in terms of screening, monitoring, and administration costs (Hulme and Mosley,
1996; Conning, 1999; Paxton and Cuevas, 2002; Lapenu and Zeller, 2002). Due to its higher
operating costs, BRAC Tanzania charge higher interest rates than the selected SACCOs.
Using the case of BRAC Tanzania group lending, the study finds that BRAC Tanzania has
achieved high repayment performance. This constitutes proof that even the poor can repay their
loans on time when the appropriate mechanisms are in place. Institutional design such as fre-
quent client visits, frequent repayment schedules, and strict loan approval processes also play an
important role.
To examine the determinants of the repayment performance in the BRAC Tanzania group
lending, a logit regression was used. The results confirm as well as contradict the views generally
stated in the literature. Peer pressure and social ties in the groups show no significant effects on
improving repayment performance. This is contrary to what the theory would predict. The impli-
cation of this result is that social ties and group pressure are not necessary for the loan repayment
performance of groups in BRAC Tanzania’s group lending program.
Groups located in different areas appear to enforce repayment within their membership in
different ways. In urban areas, repayment rates are improved primarily by joint liability. For
groups located in rural areas, where information can be obtained at low cost, peer screening is an
important factor in improving the repayment rates. The functions of groups also differ according to
the location. In rural areas, peer screening and peer monitoring show significant effects, whereas
in urban areas, only peer monitoring exhibits a significant effect.
Considering all the results above, semi-formal MFIs still face several challenges. The two
representative semi-formal MFIs in this study fail to gain efficiency, and BRAC Tanzania continues
to charge higher interest rates than SACCOs due to the high operating costs of providing small
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loans.
Given the results above, this study suggests that semi-formal MFIs need to be successful in
extending loans to poor borrowers while at the same being able to develop cost-lending practices.
It is extremely important for semi-formal MFIs to improve efficiency so that interest rates charged
can be low. To do so, semi-formal MFIs have to show extreme willingness to learn by trial and
error, leave behind what does not work, and searching for new innovations that will reduce the
cost. They must be willing and be able to adjust and adapt to changing circumstances over time,
as well as in response to the detailed demands of their clients. The greater expectation is placed
on the potential of technology to enhance efficiency.
In the case of BRAC Tanzania group lending, this study recommends that it is necessary for
BRAC Tanzania to differentiate between the urban and rural groups when formulating its policies.
Some of the mechanisms that ensure success differ depending on the location. Also, BRAC Tanza-
nia has to make important modifications to its group lending system. Those modifications should
be geared toward minimizing the dropout rates and costs incurred by members. Forced contribu-
tions for defaulters and fraud which are implemented by staff should also be well examined and
measures should be taken.
7.2 Policy Implications
Based on the findings, this study has the following policy implications: The representative semi-
formal MFIs differ despite the fact that they fall under the same category. Their differences include
their institutional structures, products, and target clients. This study, therefore, suggests diversifi-
cation of the underlying regulations to address the differences in operations and services offered
by semi-formal MFIs.
Furthermore, the representative semi-formal MFIs fail to achieve efficiency. Greater attention
must be paid to reducing operating costs and enhancing efficiency so that a large proportion of
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the poor can be served by semi-formal MFIs. It is important for the government to support and
create an environment that encourages innovations in financial systems. Such support can include
investment in infrastructure or in innovations that aims to achieve a cost-effective provision of
financial services.
The results suggest that even poor borrowers can pay back the loans reliably and on time.
For this reason, the government should encourage and promote broader participation of other
MFIs, especially formal MFIs, to fill the huge unmet demands, especially among women and ru-
ral residents. Semi-formal MFIs have already tried and proved that they can work with the poor.
Government support may motivate other providers such as commercial banks to offer microloans.
Many potential lessons might be drawn from semi-formal MFIs. For example, a variety of col-
lateral substitutes and repayment incentives can be used. Continued promotion and support of
semi-formal MFIs is also important.
7.3 Limitation of the Study and Areas for Future Research
Due to the data limitations, the repayment performance of SACCOs could not be analyzed. For
future studies, it is important to analyze the repayment performance of SACCOs. However, it will
be difficult to analyze the repayment performance of SACCOs if the current trend of the record-
keeping will continue. The currents reports and audited financial statements of the SACCOs have
not reported any information regarding the defaults or loan repayment. The member’s information
regarding the repayment performance also seems to be unreliable. This study suggests improve-
ments in the data for future analysis. In addition, to further analyze the efficiency gain over time,
long time series data is necessary.
The selected SACCOs, apart from loan provision they also provide savings services to its
members. It is also important for future studies to analyze the performance of the savings services
offered by SACCOs since members can benefit from savings services in SACCOs, and SACCOs
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can obtain the loanable funds. Recent research shows that external sources funds (borrowing) are
becoming a central part of the SACCOs loan portfolio as compared to internal sources of funds
(member savings), which cause a threat to saving practices of SACCOs in Tanzania (Ndiege et al.,
2013). In addition, microfinance literature in different parts of the world emphasizes the impor-
tance of savings, even for the poor. Household surveys indicate that the poor do have some surplus
that they use for non-essential expenditures (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007). Similarly, detailed “diary”
studies document complexity in poor households’ financial portfolios and highlight the demand
for small irregular flows to be aggregated into lump sums for household or business investment
(Rutherford, 2000; Collins et al., 2009). More recently, field experiments are producing a growing
body of evidence on impacts of savings (Brune et al., 2011; Dupas and Robinson, 2013a,b; Prina,
2015).
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Appendices
Appendix A: Field Photos
Figure 8.1: BRAC Tanzania: Member’s passbook (cover page)
The passbook contains general information of the member and transactions are recorded inside. Each member must
bring their passbooks during weekly group meeting. First passbook will be given without any charge and for
subsequent passbook the member has to pay Tshs 500.
Photo taken by author in March 2018.
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Figure 8.2: BRAC Tanzania: Members passbook (inner pages).
BRAC Tanzania maintain members records through passbooks where information on repayment
and amount to be repaid is recorded weekly.
The passbook is also a means to ensure the group discipline. As seen in the picture member who
is late for the group meeting or late in repayment is signed with a red pen. If member’s passbook
is signed with red pen many times, then the member can be denied a loan, or the amount can be
reduced.
Photo taken by Author in March 2018.
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Figure 8.3: Members of BRAC Tanzania gather for the weekly group meeting
At such group meeting, members signs their loans, submits repayments and approve new members. Usually, the
officer from the respective BRAC branch must be present during such meetings. In this photo, members can be seen
with their passbooks, while listening to the BRAC officer (center of this photo).
Photo taken by Author in March 2018.
Figure 8.4: BRAC Tanzania members gather for the weekly group meeting
Photo taken by Author in March 2018.
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Figure 8.5: A member of BRAC Tanzania (center) at the local market. One of the eligibility
criteria for a person to become BRAC Tanzania member, she must run a small business. Most
members in the survey area were working in the markets selling mainly food products. As survey
results show members utilize loans for purchasing stocks for their business.
Photo taken by Author in March 2018.
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Appendix B: Contribution of Microfinance to Society
While microfinance institutions have a direct contribution to the lenders, it also has several con-
tributions to society. Some of the contributions are directly or indirectly linked to society. The
discussion on the social contribution of microfinance to the society will be discussed based on the
studied two representative microfinance institutions in Tanzania. Listed below are some of the
contributions of microfinance in society.
1. Women empowerment: For example, BRAC Tanzania loans specifically target women as
clients. Loans offered enables women to engage in different economic activities and earning
income. This enables women to become more confident, more assertive, and more likely to
participate in family and community decisions. Also, participation of women in the group
meetings implemented by MFIs such as BRAC Tanzania gives women a chance to be group
leaders and speak out their ideas and prepare them to be future leaders in their society.
2. The gains from participation in microfinance programs lead to growing economies of the
borrower’s families and the society that surrounds the borrowers.
3. Various training provided by microfinance institutions can also be transferred to non-member
and society.
4. Microfinance can also contribute to society through community services. For, example Na-
nenane SACCOs which is one of the surveyed SACCOs in this study, dedicate part of the
profit to help the orphan center.
5. The loans provided by microfinance institutions such as those provided by BRAC Tanzania
and SACCOs can be used for different purposes, such as payment of school fees.
6. Microfinance institutions have programs aiming at serving the community. For exam-
ple, the BRAC Tanzania ELA program provides training through clubs made to support
girls with various problems related to early pregnancy and marriage, HIV/AIDS, gender-
based discrimination, reproductive health and services, child rights, violence, rape, and drug
abuse. BRAC Tanzania also has an education program to support girls who had dropped out
halfway through lower-secondary education.
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Appendix C: Additional Tables
Table 8.1: General description of the sample
Group name Year
estab-
lished
Number
of
found-
ing
mem-
bers
Number
of cur-
rent
mem-
bers
Number
of ac-
tive
mem-
bers
Number
of in-
active
mem-
bers
Number
of new
mem-
bers
Number
of bor-
rowers
Number
of
inter-
viewed
mem-
bers
Sinai 2007 20 36 31 5 2 29 32
Wema 2006 30 8 7 1 0 6 7
Galilaya 2007 20 20 16 4 3 15 12
Ushindi 2006 20 8 8 0 1 8 6
Mkombozi 2006 20 10 10 0 0 7 6
Sayuni 2007 20 37 36 1 4 30 33
Tafuteni 2007 20 26 24 2 2 18 23
Utukufu 2006 20 16 15 1 0 13 16
Maendeleo 2006 20 21 17 4 2 13 13
Rehema 2007 30 38 32 6 2 31 29
Total 220 220 196 24 16 170 177
Source: Field survey, 2018
Table 8.2: Expansion of BRAC Tanzania’s microfinance program in Arusha region
Year Number of branches Number of groups Number of members
2011 14 885 17,625
2012 14 897 16,379
2013 14 813 15,861
2014 14 802 17,390
2015 14 868 19,308
2016 15 951 19,422
2017 15 990 19,131
2018 15 1018 19,942
2019 17 1154 22,374
Source: BRAC Tanzania reports compiled by author, 2019.
Note: Data for 2019 is as of May.
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Table 8.3: Comparison of BRAC and BRAC Tanzania group lending programs
BRAC BRAC Tanzania
Target
Target clients Women Women
Proportion of rural borrowers 86% 80%
Lending
Model Group lending without joint
liability
Group lending without joint
liability
Group size 30-40 members 15-35 members
Main loan product Microloans (also known as
Dabi)
Microloans (also known as
Microfinance)
Loan sizes (microloans) USD 50-700 USD 89-2232
Other loan products Small enterprise loans (also
known as Progoti) which
target business
Small enterprise loans (SEP)
targeting business owners
Repayment schedule (microloans) Weekly Weekly
Security fund 5% of the loan 10% of the loan
Principal loan users Male Female
Loan use Various include home-
stead businesses, fishery,
milk cows rearing, buying
rickshaws, etc.
Various include trading,
construction, education, etc.
Loan recovery High (98.8%) High (98.6%)
Group meetings
Frequency Once a week Once a week
Place of group meetings Group leader’s house Group leader’s house, mem-
ber house or public places
To ensure group discipline 18 promises 15 promises
Others
Other financial services Insurance and savings Insurance
Incentive for good members Top up loans Top up loans
Gender of the field staff Male Female
Source: Author’s compilations.
Table 8.4: BRAC Tanzania’s loan approval authority
Loan range (TShs) Loan types Approved by
250,000-900,000 Repeat loans Branch Manager
250,000-500,000 New Loans Area Manager
900,001-1,700,000 Repeat Loans Area Manager
1,700,001-3,000,000 All loans Regional Manager
3,000,001-5,000,000 All loans Senior Regional Manager
Loan type Increase amount (TShs)
Repeat loan Up to 50% increase of the previous loan Branch Manager
Repeat loan 400000 Area Manager
Repeat loan >40000 Regional Manager
Source: BRAC Tanzania reports. Note: USD 1 was equivalent to TShs 2240 at the time of the survey.
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Appendix D: Variables used in the empirical analysis and expected signs.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable, which is takes a value of one if a group had any
member with overdue and zero if the group has no member with overdue (paid all installments on
time) at the time of the survey.
All the dummy variables equals one if yes and zero otherwise.
Table 8.5: Variables and expected signs for logit analysis
Independent Variables Expected Sign
Peer screening
Group has ever rejected applicants (dummy) Negative
Peer monitoring
Distance difference (minutes) Positive
Number of hamlets/streets relative to group size Positive
Members who work at the same place (%) Negative
Group has the internal rules (dummy) Negative
Group size Positive
Peer pressure or sanctions
Excluded stubborn/ default members (%) Negative
Group has ever seized member’s properties (dummy) Negative
Social ties
Members who are relatives (%) Ambiguous
Joint liability
Group has ever contributed for another member’s repayment (dummy) Negative
Contributing for another member is compulsory (dummy) Negative
Control variables
Members who are married (%) Negative
Members with permanent residence (%) Negative
Group is located in rural area (dummy) Negative
Age of the group (years) Ambiguous
Guarantor cooperates to ensure repayment (dummy) Negative
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